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CONSENT AND COERCION 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan* 
ABSTRACT 
There are substantial disputes as to what sorts of behavior constitute 
coercion and thereby undermine consent. This disagreement was on full 
display during the public fray over Aziz Ansari’s behavior on a date. Whereas 
some commentators condemned Ansari’s behavior as nothing short of sexual 
assault, others believed his behavior did not rise to the level of undermining 
consent. 
This Article claims that the way forward is to see that there are two 
normative functions for coercion, and each is at play with respect to consent. 
Sometimes coercion is about the blameworthiness of the coercer, and 
sometimes coercion is about the involuntariness of the consenter’s choice. To 
deny the latter is not to deny the former. Because these are two disparate 
functions, much of the debate about Ansari may be commentators talking past 
each other. 
After explaining this miscommunication, this Article broadens our 
understanding of how the blameworthiness of the coercer can bear on the 
permissibility of his actions. Just as no man may profit from his own wrong, 
coercers may not avail themselves of consent, even if it is sufficiently “freely 
given” such that the consenter is not acting involuntarily. This Article claims 
that the wrongful coercion “normatively impairs” the coercer, and that this 
normative impairment is at play in other legal doctrines. 
With the normative grounding in place, this Article considers how and if 
these amendments to our view of coercion should be taken into account in the 
law, with a specific focus on sexual offenses. It offers a draft statute for 
discussion purposes, considers charges of paternalism in both the public and 
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private sphere, and points to other reasons to be cautious about 
criminalization. Finally, this Article defends this view as a more perspicuous 
account of the normative landscape than other coercion theories. 
Ultimately, the goal of this Article is to define new conceptual territory for 
normative debate. Progress cannot be made until we ask the right questions 
and answer the same ones. This Article aims to provide the framework within 
which more nuanced discussions can be had. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The effect of coercion spans legal doctrines.1 Coercion impacts contracts,2 
unconstitutional conditions,3 plea bargains,4 duties to obey the law,5 medical 
ethics,6 and duress.7 Scholars have struggled to articulate the test for coercion 
that captures its range and limits.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 1. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION, at xi (Marshall Cohen ed., 1988) (searching for a 
unifying theory across legal doctrines); Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 720 (2005) (arguing for a view of coercion and applying it across legal 
doctrines); Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 
45, 46 (2002) (arguing that legal doctrines require two distinct types of coercion). 
 2. See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 23 (surveying duress cases in contracts and 
looking for the underlying justification); Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 753 (“It is 
beyond dispute that an improper threat can create duress and justify the rescission of the 
contract . . . .”); Stephen A. Smith, Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress, 56 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 343, 343 (1997) (noting that in contract law, “courts are regularly required to 
consider how far the scope of duress should extend”); Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to 
Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175, 176 (1997) (“A bargain entered into under duress 
is not enforceable.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2001) (defending “a new unified theory of 
unconstitutional conditions . . . that centers on coercion”); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational 
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352 
(1984) (employing coercion’s threats/offers/baseline analysis and concluding “that the distinction 
between liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats turns on the establishment of an 
acceptable baseline against which to measure a person’s position after imposition of an 
allocation”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1433 
(1989) (noting the Supreme Court “has often invoked coercion as the reason to strike down 
conditions that affect rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association, but without a 
consistent or satisfying theory”). 
 4. See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 122 (arguing critics may be wrong to see the 
problem with plea bargaining as its coerciveness); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s 
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1298 (1975) (“When our consciences cause us to 
deny the coercive character of the system that we have created, we magnify its injustice as we 
delude ourselves.”); Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 763 (“Plea bargains are a unique 
species of contract that raises frequent concerns of coercion.”); Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s 
Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1127 (2016) (arguing for a proportionality baseline in 
the determination of whether a plea bargain is coercive); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea 
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 13 (1978) (“Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive.”). 
 5. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, THREE ANARCHICAL FALLACIES: AN ESSAY ON 
POLITICAL AUTHORITY 71–124 (1998) (arguing that “law is coercive” is a fallacy); FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 8 (2015) (arguing that coercion is the distinguishing feature of 
law); Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi], 4 POL. THEORY 65, 78 (1976) 
(concluding that some forms of civil disobedience may be coercive in the non-pejorative sense). 
 6. See, e.g., Eric Chwang, Against Risk-Benefit Review of Prisoner Research, 24 
BIOETHICS 14, 15–18 (2010) (rejecting use of methodology for children as appropriate for adult 
prisoners and discussing problems of coercion with respect to prisoner consent); Joseph Millum, 
Consent Under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party Coercion, 17 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL 
PRAC. 113, 116 (2014) (arguing that consentee may sometimes proceed in the face of third-party 
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Coercion is particularly important to consent. Consent waives a right one 
has against interference with one’s person or property, rendering something 
that was previously impermissible, permissible.9 But when coercion is 
present, it renders this act of consenting null and void. If someone points a 
gun at you and then asks whether he may enter your home, your “yes” is 
neither morally nor legally efficacious. 
Consent and coercion bear on numerous boundary crossings, but their 
conjunction is at its most controversial in cases of sexual assault. It is in this 
context that we must settle disputed normative questions about the kinds of 
behavior that are sufficiently coercive so as to be designated “rape.” Although 
threats of deadly force have always negated consent,10 other threats have 
proven more problematic. For instance, in the notorious Thompson case, a 
high school principal’s threat that he would prevent a student from graduating 
unless she performed oral sex on him did not fall within the statutorily 
provided types of threats that invalidated consent.11 
Although many jurisdictions have broadened their definitions of 
coercion,12 the kind of coercive behavior that invalidates consent still faces 
contested perimeters. Indeed, the recent debate about actor Aziz Ansari is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
coercion and suggesting how researchers should analyze such cases); O. O’Neill, Some Limits on 
Informed Consent, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 4, 5 (2003) (“The ethical importance of informed consent 
in and beyond medical practice is, I think, more elementary. It provides reasonable assurance that 
a patient (research subject, tissue donor) has not been deceived or coerced.”). 
 7. See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 146 (discussing legal formulation of duress); 
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1989) (theorizing when duress should excuse). 
 8. See generally WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, for the most sustained cross-doctrinal 
analysis to date. For an example of the extraordinarily broad reach of coercion questions, see 
Mollie Gerver, Refugee Repatriation and the Problem of Consent, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 855, 859 
(arguing that the United Nations and NGOs may face a “coercion dilemma” in deciding whether 
to assist with forced relocations of refugees). 
 9. DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 165 (2012) (“[C]onsent involves 
not the granting of a right but just the waiving of it.”); Peter Westen, Commentary, Some 
Confusions About Consent in Rape Law, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 333, 334 (2004) (“[C]onsent 
creates a Hohfeldian ‘privilege’” to engage in an action that would otherwise be wrongful.). 
 10. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Peter Westen, How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About 
Rape, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 759, 781 (2017) (“All Western jurisdictions have always made it a 
crime to induce sexual intercourse by threats of death or serious bodily injury.”). 
 11. State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Mont. 1990); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 
213.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (defining “Gross Sexual Imposition” as “[a] male who has sexual 
intercourse with a female not his wife commits a felony of the third degree if: (a) he compels her 
to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution”). 
 12. See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the 
“Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1120–26 (2011) (surveying statutory and case law conceptions of non-
physical coercion). 
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latest boundary to be tested. The incident, as described to a reporter by a 
woman with the pseudonym “Grace,” involved Grace going on a date with 
Ansari, where they went back to his apartment and things quickly escalated.13 
They went out to dinner and then went back to his apartment.14 When she 
admired his kitchen counters, he suggested that she hop up and sit on one.15 
Within ten minutes, both were naked and both had, at least briefly, performed 
oral sex on the other.16 But Grace didn’t want to have sexual intercourse with 
Ansari.17 And he proceeded to needle and harangue her. 
Grace says that she gave physical and verbal cues that she did not want to 
proceed to intercourse, but that Ansari was relentless.18 He kept grabbing her 
hand to touch his genitals.19 He would place his hand in her mouth and then 
try to digitally penetrate her. When she wanted to wait for another date, he 
said, “If I pour you a glass of wine now, would it count as our second date?”20 
She excused herself to the bathroom, and returned saying she didn’t want to 
feel forced into anything.21 He told her they could chill on the couch but—in 
a moment that was “particularly significant” for Grace—almost immediately 
then requested oral sex which she performed.22 He led her around the 
apartment to pick a spot for them to have intercourse, but when she said again 
that she was not going to do so, he relented.23 They then put on their clothes, 
and Grace soon left.24  
Public opinion is significantly divided over the Ansari incident, so much 
so that Saturday Night Live did a sketch about how difficult many individuals 
find it to talk about this particular case.25 In the New York Times, Bari Weiss 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 13. Katie Way, I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the Worst Night of My 
Life, BABE (Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
  25. Saturday Night Live: Dinner Discussion (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 2018). The 
Ansari debate also implicates controversial questions of race and power. See, e.g., Caitlin 
Flanagan, The Humiliation of Aziz Ansari, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/the-humiliation-of-aziz-ansari/
550541/ (“I thought it would take a little longer for the hit squad of privileged young white women 
to open fire on brown-skinned men.”); Flannery Dean, 10 Women, from 24 to 60, on Aziz Ansari, 
Sexual Assault and Bad Sex, FLARE (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.flare.com/news/aziz-ansari-
sexual-harassment/image/5/ (statement of Soraya Roberts) (“Aziz Ansari is a male celebrity who 
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wrote an opinion column arguing that Ansari was “guilty of not being a mind 
reader.”26 She condemned the loss of female agency in Grace’s story, 
essentially arguing that if Ansari was being a boorish jerk, then Grace should 
have just left.27 In contrast, other commentators condemn the sex that results 
from incessant cajolery like Ansari’s as nothing short of rape.28 And some 
university’s Title IX regulations appear to cover conduct like Ansari’s as 
sexual misconduct.29 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
brought a female non-celebrity to his apartment and, regardless of his unspoken politics or beliefs, 
that means, in our society, he holds the power.”). 
 26. Bari Weiss, Opinion, Aziz Ansari Is Guilty. Of Not Being a Mind Reader, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/aziz-ansari-babe-sexual-
harassment.html. 
 27. See id.  
I am a proud feminist, and this is what I thought while reading the article: 
If you are hanging out naked with a man, it’s safe to assume he is going to try 
to have sex with you. If the failure to choose a pinot noir over a pinot grigio 
offends you, you can leave right then and there. If you don’t like the way your 
date hustles through paying the check, you can say, “I’ve had a lovely evening 
and I’m going home now.” If you go home with him and discover he’s a 
terrible kisser, say, “I’m out.” If you start to hook up and don’t like the way he 
smells or the way he talks (or doesn’t talk), end it. If he pressures you to do 
something you don’t want to do, use a four-letter word, stand up on your two 
legs and walk out his door.    
Id.; see also Lucia Brawley, Let’s Be Honest About Aziz Ansari, CNN (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/17/opinions/lets-be-honest-about-aziz-ansari-brawley/index.html 
(arguing that Ansari is not like Harvey Weinstein and that women need to be more assertive in 
saying “no”); Flanagan, supra, note 25 (noting Grace did not feel “frozen, terrified, [or] stuck” 
and characterizing the babe.net article as “revenge porn” and Ansari as the victim). 
 28. Michaela Lindsey, Opinion, Silence Is Not Consent: Sexual Assault and Aziz Ansari, 
COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/opinion/
2018/02/08/silence-is-not-consentsexual-assault-and-aziz-ansari/ (construing Ansari’s behavior 
to be sexual assault); Devon Price, A Few Words About Sexual Coercion, in the Wake of the Aziz 
Ansari Accusations, MEDIUM (Jan. 13, 2018), https://medium.com/@dr_eprice/a-few-words-
about-sexual-coercion-in-the-wake-of-the-aziz-ansari-accusations-7db015c1cde5 (describing 
giving in to a man who “begged, bothered, asked, cajoled, [and] coerced” and characterizing the 
encounter as “sexual assault” and him as a “rapist”); Carol Shih, Opinion, How 18 Women 
Responded to ‘Grace’ and the Aziz Ansari Allegation, LILY (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.thelily.com/how-18-women-responded-to-grace-and-the-aziz-ansari-allegation/ 
(quoting one online comment as indicating “[C]onsent can only be given in the form of a verbal 
and enthusiastic, ‘YES!’ Not a ‘yes’ that feels guilted into performing any kind of sexual act. She 
did not consent. This was sexual assault”). 
 29. See, e.g., QUINNIPIAC UNIV., SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND HARASSMENT POLICY 9 (2017), 
https://www.qu.edu/content/dam/qu/documents/Definition-and-Scope.pdf.  
Coercion is unreasonable pressure for sexual activity. Coercion is the use of 
emotional manipulation to persuade someone to do something they may not 
want to do, such as being sexual or performing certain sexual acts. Being 
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This debate stems from insufficient nuance as to how coercion works. One 
significant problem is that we often are not even talking about the same thing. 
In The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, Mitchell Berman argued 
that identifying the conceptual contours of coercion is a quixotic quest, as 
there is not just one concept of coercion.30 Instead, there are two. Sometimes 
coercion is a question of whether the coercer has acted wrongfully, 
coercionW, and sometimes coercion is a question of when the coercee is 
excused for her conduct, coercionE.31 Although Berman failed to attend to 
consent in any detail, his insight applies here. It also explains why, in the 
context of sexual assault, our judgments about “coerced sex” are so contested. 
We need one view of coercion to tell us when the consenter’s choice is so 
constrained that it cannot be deemed the exercise of the normative power of 
waiving her right not to be touched (and I will slightly modify coercionE so 
as to cover such cases).32 But we need a second view of coercion to tell us 
when, even if this choice is not constrained to that extent, the coercer’s 
behavior is wrongful and condemnable. 
Beyond deploying Berman’s insight, this Article raises a second and more 
central claim. There is more we can say about coercionW than that the coercer 
behaved wrongfully. We can talk about the normative consequences of that 
wrongful behavior. Here, I contend that like the equitable doctrine that “no 
man may profit from his own wrong,” the coercionW renders the coercer 
unable to avail herself of the consent.33 The idea behind this further important 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
coerced into having sex or performing sexual acts is not consenting sex and is 
considered sexual misconduct.  
Id. at 10. See also Eugene Volokh, Getting Sex by Saying ‘If You Don’t Have Sex with Me I Will 
Find Someone Who Will’ = Rape or Sexual Assault?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 
1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/01/getting-sex-
by-saying-if-you-dont-have-sex-with-me-i-will-find-someone-who-will-rape-or-sexual-
assault/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5e863e28ff70 (discussing the then-existing Clark University 
definition of coercion). 
 30. Berman, supra note 1, at 46 (“The single unified conception of coercion that theorists 
seek, I will argue, is of little, if any, normative significance.”). 
 31. Id. at 49. Berman explains: 
In short, then, I am assuming that coercion claims serve two normative 
functions: (1) to determine whether A’s conduct is at least prima facially 
wrongful or whether A is blameworthy; and (2) to determine whether B is 
excused for conduct that would otherwise warrant blame; that these are the 
only normative functions such claims serve; and that these functions are, in 
principle, quite distinct. 
Id. at 48. 
 32. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 33. Cf. Arudra Burra, The Significance of Consent 19 (Oct. 23, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that this conception of wrongdoing does all the 
normative heavy lifting). 
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implication is that the coercer’s misconduct prevents her from helping herself 
to the consent. The coercer is normatively impaired from benefitting from the 
consent. Although absent coercionE the harm or evil of rape is not present, 
the coercer’s behavior is still wrongful, though the conduct may not be as 
wrongful as when it is the product of coercionE. 
This Article thus provides a more comprehensive structure to coercion 
debates. Part I gives a broad overview of coercion, including Berman’s two 
normative functions, and consent. Part II begins by reconceptualizing 
coercionE as coercionC, that is, coercion where the choice is undermined, 
because coercionE creates the misimpression that we are excusing rape 
victims instead of looking at the effectiveness of their constrained choices. 
Part II then parses the intersection of consent and the two types of coercion 
and explains why this conceptual division can illuminate the Ansari incident. 
Part III moves to a further normative implication beyond Berman’s initial 
division of labor. It argues that the result of coercionW is to prevent the 
coercer from availing himself of the fruits of his wrongdoing. That is, though 
it is a crime distinct from rape, the coercer acts wrongfully if he avails himself 
of the consent he procured through a wrongful threat. It further explains that 
coercionC is not a necessary component for this normative impairment and 
defends the view that that any causal relation is sufficient to normatively 
impair the coercer. It also reveals that this type of normative impairment 
functions in other doctrines, including entrapment and unclean hands. 
Finally, it contends that this insight offers a better account of the cases than 
Berman’s does. Part IV addresses criminalization. It provides a draft statute 
for discussion; it addresses charges of paternalism in the civil and criminal 
domains; and it raises, more generally, worries about criminalization. Part V 
addresses two alternative approaches to coercion, one of which argues that 
all the normative work can be done by coercionW-type analysis and the other 
which argues that all normative work can be done by coercionC-type analysis. 
This part explains why both normative functions better cohere with how 
coercion works, particularly when it comes to the implications for third 
parties. Ultimately, the ambition for this paper is not to endorse a particular 
substantive account of either type of coercion, but rather to create conceptual 
space for different types of arguments. We will make progress in our 
arguments only after we are actually arguing about the same thing. 
I. SOME PRELIMINARIES 
This Section provides an overview of the concepts of consent and 
coercion. It begins with the general theoretical understanding of what 
coercion is. It then turns to Mitch Berman’s refinements to coercion, 
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separating when it is wrongful from when it is excusing. Finally, it turns to 
both the mental act and the communication views of consent. 
A. Coercion Generally 
The standard view is that coercion is an act that wrongfully reduces 
another person’s choice set by threatening to make the coercee worse off if 
the coercee does not comply with the coercer’s demand.34 The man at the 
door with a gun to your head threatens to make you worse off (by shooting 
you) if you do not do what he wants (let him in). This is to be distinguished 
from compulsion, which is when another person deploys force to cause the 
act to happen, as when the person simply pushes you out of the way and 
barges in.35 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 34. Joel Feinberg argues: 
A coerces B into agreeing to his harmful or dangerous treatment of B in these 
cases when: 
1. A demands that B consent to it; 
2. A makes a threat to B (or in some cases a “coercive offer”) that he (A) will 
cause or fail to prevent some consequences that B finds unwelcome unless B 
complies with the demand; 
3. A gives B some evidence of the credibility of the threat, usually a 
demonstration of his power as well as his willingness to carry it out; and 
4. unless he is bluffing, A has actively intervened in B’s option-network to 
acquire control of the relevant option-switches; in particular he can close tight 
the conjunctive option that consists of B’s noncompliance with the demand 
and B’s avoidance of the threatened unwelcome consequences; and 
5. B understands the proposal and is frightened by it, and at least partly to avoid 
an unwelcome projected consequence, complies with A’s demand. 
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 198 (1986). Feinberg later allows for bluffs to count as coercive, 
and as noted above, requires a success condition for “coercion.” Id. With respect to the latter, it 
may be that we do not use the term “coercion” in ordinary language without a success condition, 
but the wrong of coercion may not require that the coercive behavior be successful. 
 Theorists also distinguish threats from warnings. “A warning is a prediction that an 
unwelcome event will happen or that it will happen if certain circumstances arise.” Smith, supra 
note 2, at 346; see also Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1081, 1096 (1981) (“One person coerces another by putting him under such great 
psychological pressure that a rational decision is impossible, by creating unfair conditions of 
choice, or by manipulating belief about relevant facts; informing someone of true but disquieting 
facts beyond one’s control is clearly not to coerce. [A] warning is not situation-altering, since it 
communicates about an environment that already exists.”). 
 35. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF 
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 186 (2004) (“Compulsion can play no role in 
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Essential to this definition, then, is that coercers threaten. The distinction 
between threats and offers is often critical to coercion discussions,36 although 
there are those theorists who argue that there are coercive offers.37 Our focus 
will be on when threats are wrongful,38 though there are no doubt wrongful 
offers.39 
To know if something is a threat, we need to know whether its execution 
will make the coercee worse off. A threat brings the coercee below a baseline, 
whereas offers bring the coercee above the baseline.40 This baseline can be 
conceptualized predictively or normatively. This was famously illustrated by 
Robert Nozick’s slave case (using the standard denotations in the literature 
that A is the coercer and B is the coercee): 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
identifying wrongful pressures because compulsion brings about x not by pressuring [B] to 
exercise her will in favor of acquiescing in x, but by bringing x about without regard to any 
exercise of will on [B’s] part.”); Berman, supra note 1, at 51 (arguing that the term “coercion” 
“envisions conduct that somehow induces action by another without forcibly compelling it”); 
Craig L. Carr, Coercion and Freedom, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 60 (1988) (arguing that coercion 
involves choice and compulsion does not); Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral 
Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 65, 65 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973) (calling 
compulsion cases instances of “physical coercion”); see FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 189 
(describing a “spectrum of force” “running from compulsion proper, at one extreme, . . . to 
manipulation, persuasion, enticement, and simple requests at the other extreme”). 
 36. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 118 (1998) (“To distinguish legitimate influence from impermissible coercion, 
the best way to begin is to consider whether the inducement being deployed amounts to an offer 
or a threat.”). 
 37. Coercive offers include exploitation, which is distinguished below, infra text 
accompanying notes 44–45. Frankfurt thinks that exploitative offers are threats. See Frankfurt, 
supra note 35, at 71–72 (setting forth conditions of wrongful exploitation and then concluding 
that A is threatening B). 
 38. The arguments made in Part III can be extended to apply to exploitation and deception 
as well. However, each of these areas requires its own analysis of the precise boundaries that fall 
within either category, and both would require separate articles. Moreover, the goal for this paper 
is conceptual clarity with respect to coercion claims. Hence, I have narrowed our focus to threats 
alone. 
 39. For an exhaustive study, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 5 (1996) (surveying 
everything from college athletics to surrogacy contracts); cf. VICTOR TADROS, WRONGS AND 
CRIMES 228–29 (2016) (arguing that sometimes you can wrong someone by giving them options). 
 40. SCHULHOFER, supra note 36, at 120 (“A threat, in other words, is a proposal to make a 
person worse off than she has a right to be.”); WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 204 (“The crux of 
the distinction between threats and offers is quite simple: A threatens B by proposing to make B 
worse off relative to some baseline; A makes an offer to B by proposing to make B better off 
relative to some baseline.”). 
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The Slave Case. A is a slave owner who regularly beats his slave B. 
One day A proposes to spare B his regular beating if and only if B 
now does X.41 
If coercion were simply an empirical question, this would be an offer 
because it is bringing the slave above his expected baseline. He is better off 
than he expected to be. However, if the idea is the baseline at which the slave 
has a right to be, then this is a threat. Coercion is certainly deployed in both 
senses in ordinary language, but this is not an ordinary language project. The 
project here, addressing questions of responsibility, wrongdoing, and choice, 
is thoroughly normative, and our baseline should likewise reflect these 
moralized features.42 Hence, we should, following Alan Wertheimer, use the 
sense of coercion that is moralized—that considers making someone worse 
off than he ought to be.43 Given that B has a right not to be beaten, A’s 
statement is a threat, not an offer. Indeed, it would be extremely odd for our 
normative discourse not to reflect that. That is, the claim that the slave owner 
is only offering the slave a reprieve from beating rings hollow as a criminal 
defense. 
Coercion is related to, but distinct from, exploitation. Whereas coercion is 
a threat to bring someone below a moralized baseline, exploitation is unfairly 
taking advantage of the fact that someone is already below a baseline.44 If 
Alice happens upon destitute Betty and offers to make her better off if Betty 
will allow Alice to have sex with her, Alice is exploiting Betty. Exploitation 
can also involve constrained choice, but the conduct of an exploiter is distinct 
from the behavior of a coercer.45 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 41. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 450–51 (Sidney 
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). 
 42. Economists also implicitly rely on moralized baselines. As Hamish Stewart explains: 
Economists are so accustomed to working with the Pareto criteria that they are 
sometimes incapable of seeing it as an ethical standard. Similarly, law and 
economics scholars are so comfortable with the notion of wealth maximization 
that they, too, sometimes forget that while it is an alternative to the Pareto 
criterion, it is still an ethical standard. But these are ethical standards, and 
because economic theories of coercion tend to define coercion with reference 
to these standards, economic theories of coercion are moralized. 
Stewart, supra note 2, at 224. 
 43. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 212 (arguing that a moralized baseline is necessary for 
coercion claims to have moral implications); accord WESTEN, supra note 35, at 182 (arguing 
wrongful threats need to be defined with respect to a normative baseline). 
 44. Berman, supra note 1, at 85 (“Exploitation . . . connotes taking unfair advantage of a 
person’s vulnerability.”). 
 45. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 39, at 16–28; for implications of this argument to 
exploitation, see supra note 38; see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard 
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Finally, we should exercise care in deeming coerced acts to be 
“involuntary.” Unfortunately, the word “involuntary,” has numerous usages. 
It covers cases in which the person does not act, such as when he is pushed 
by another person; this is an instance that would fail to satisfy the voluntary 
act requirement of the criminal law.46 It is used for crimes of “involuntary 
manslaughter” where “involuntary” means “unintentional.”47 And finally, it 
is used for cases in which the actor is under duress.48 
It is this final sense of “involuntary” that is at work with coercion. John 
Hyman has argued that this is the only appropriate application of 
“involuntary” as “no act” is better viewed as an agency question and 
involuntary manslaughter is better viewed as a question of intention.49 In 
contrast, Margaret Gilbert has cautioned against the use of “involuntary” 
because it “trades unacceptably on an ambiguity” between no choice and a 
rational, if constrained, choice.50 For this reason, analysis of coercion should 
recognize that coercion does not render the person “witless” as Gilbert 
cautions,51 but rather, presents a situation in which the choice, an intentionally 
made and rational one, is constrained. Accordingly, an analysis of coercion 
should not rely on the notion that it renders a choice involuntary or that it 
gives the actor “no choice.”52 
B. An Introductory Glimpse at Berman’s Two Functions 
Although I have attempted to give a rough working definition, it would 
behoove us to look at Berman’s conceptual categorizing at this point. As an 
entry point, consider the influential definition of coercion by Alan 
Wertheimer, which, with respect to sexual relations, is as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 89–92 (1981) (arguing theorists are improperly employing coercion 
when they mean to argue that the state is behaving exploitatively). 
 46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (delineating instances of 
involuntariness). 
 47. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2018). 
 48. See JOHN HYMAN, ACTION, KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL 77 (2015) (arguing that “a certain 
thing is done voluntarily if, and only if, it is not done out of ignorance or compulsion”). 
 49. Id. at 5 (“The ideas of agency and voluntariness refer to different aspects of human 
action and they cannot be equated.”); id. at 8 (“‘[I]nvoluntary manslaughter’ means unintentional 
manslaughter.”). 
 50. Margaret Gilbert, Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation, 103 ETHICS 679, 686 (1993). 
 51. Id. at 685 (quoting Lord Scarman as stating, “[t]he classic case of duress is . . . not the 
lack of will to submit but the victim’s intentional submission arising from the realization that 
there is no other practical choice open to him”). 
 52. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 63 (arguing that a cancer victim may have “no choice” 
but to consent to surgery if she will otherwise die but that “her consent is still morally and legally 
important”). 
50:0951] CONSENT AND COERCION 963 
A coerces B into sexual relations when (i) A proposes to make B worse 
off relative to the appropriate baseline if she does not acquiesce and (ii)(a) it 
is reasonable for B to succumb to A’s proposal rather than suffer the 
consequences.53 
The first prong focuses on the wrongful proposal. The second prong 
focuses on the limits to the coercee’s choice. 
Berman has argued that seeking one concept of coercion is a fool’s errand. 
Instead, there are two. Within coercion, Berman’s claim is that we can 
analyze the wrongfulness of the coercer’s behavior—what he calls 
“coercionW”—separately from the excusing implications for the coercee—
what he calls “coercionE.”54 These are analytically and normatively distinct 
types of coercion.55 Behavior can be coercionW and wrongful without it 
giving rise to a claim of coercionE, and behavior can be the result of 
coercionE, without the existence of coercionW.56 In other words, each of 
Wertheimer’s prongs is independently important. 
Let us drill down on each of these concepts, and let us begin with coercionE 
as it manifests many of the features that we typically think are important to 
coercion. “Put simply . . . , coercionE is an excuse extended as a concession 
to the actor’s severely constrained choice situation.”57 As Berman has 
explained: 
The gist of a coercionE claim is that one has acted under 
circumstances in which the consequences of doing otherwise were 
so grave that one’s ability to choose otherwise was substantially 
constrained. The claim therefore has two basic components: first, 
an explanatory requirement that constraining circumstances existed 
that caused B to do as she did—that, we might say, B “acted under 
duress”—and second, an objective moral evaluation of B’s conduct 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 53. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 165 (2003). I have omitted (iib) 
which entails a coercer taking advantage of the coercee’s unreasonable fears. See id. at 184–85 
(condemning such behavior as coercive). The intersection of normative judgments (“reasonable 
opportunities”) with diminished capacities raises complex questions which need not detain us 
here. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 147–48 (2009) (arguing that person of “reasonable firmness” is an 
objective determination of what society can expect of a defendant but that the law ought to employ 
a separate excusing criterion for diminished rationality). 
 54. Berman, supra note 1, at 49 (stipulating “let coercionW (for coercion-wrongful) stand 
for the normative conclusion that an individual (A) has engaged in coercion; let coercionE (for 
coercion-excused) represent the normative conclusion that an individual (B) has acted under 
coercion”). 
 55. Id. at 48 (arguing “these functions are, in principle, quite distinct”). 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 62–67. 
 57. Berman, supra note 1, at 59. 
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in light of those constraints or in light of the psychological pressure 
B experienced.58 
The Model Penal Code’s definition of duress is instructive: 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by 
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or 
the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his 
situation would have been unable to resist.59 
In other words, if A threatens to break B’s daughter’s arm, unless B breaks 
C’s arm,60 then this will be excused if we believe that B’s choice was 
constrained, that B felt psychological pressure, and that objectively the 
conduct (breaking C’s arm) in light of the threat (the broken arm of her child) 
should excuse B. 
Now consider coercionW. CoercionW is a subset of wrongful proposals. 
CoercionW is wrongful “by dint of placing improper pressure on the 
recipient’s choice.”61 In other words, it is a threat to place the victim below 
the baseline at which she is entitled to be. 
The presence of coercionE is not necessary for coercionW. Using Berman’s 
example, assume that Charles tells David that unless David kills Edward, 
Charles will egg David’s home.62 In such a case, clearly David will not be 
excused if he kills Edward. Still, it is the case that Charles wrongfully 
threatened David.63 There is coercionW without coercionE. Moreover, even 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 58. Id. at 60. 
 59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2017); see also FEINBERG, supra note 
34, at 192 (“[S]ome alternative has been made not impossible but unreasonable for me, or (as 
some writers put it) ineligible for my choice.”). 
 60. I am intentionally creating a case where what A is requiring B to do is not the lesser 
evil, which would be its own justification under the Model Penal Code: 
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to 
himself or another is justifiable, provided that: 
the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and . . . 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a). 
 61. Berman, supra note 1, at 52. Some theorists dispute Berman’s conception of coercionW 
because it entails that if it is wrong to do A then it is wrong to threaten to do A. Scott Anderson, 
Coercion, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2017 
ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/coercion/. Although in the context of 
nuclear weapons, some theorists suggested that it may be permissible to threaten to do what one 
may not do, these additional complications need not detain us. 
 62. Berman, supra note 1, at 59. 
 63. Id. 
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though David ought not to succumb to Charles’ threat, Charles has still 
behaved wrongfully and could be subject to criminal prosecution for that 
threat. 
Conversely, just as we can evaluate the wrongfulness of Charles’ threat 
independently of whether David gets an excuse for being coerced, so, too, we 
can excuse someone for being coerced even without the presence of 
coercionW. The argument that coercionE is independent of coercionW is 
familiar to criminal law scholars. The majority of criminal law scholars 
contend that the Model Penal Code’s test for duress is wrong because it 
requires a coercer.64 Why should it matter if B runs over two people in the 
road because (1) she needs to do so to avoid being killed by a falling rock, or 
(2) she needs to do so because otherwise A will kill her?65 The unfair 
limitations to her choice exist irrespective of the source of the threat.66 
Accordingly, many scholars argue that B should be excused for her conduct.67 
For these reasons, Berman claims that coercionW and coercionE can be 
analyzed separately.68 CoercionE, which excuses an actor, is the theory that 
underlies duress. In contrast, the wrongfulness of the coercer’s conduct can 
render the coercer’s behavior blameworthy. 
C. Consent Generally 
Before applying coercion to consent, we should be clear what we mean by 
consent. First, let us understand the underlying moral relations. Typically, 
individuals have claim rights to non-interference. Another person is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 64. See, e.g., id. at 63–65 (concluding based on duress cases and a series of other 
hypotheticals that the normative question surrounding coercionE does not depend on coercionW); 
Dressler, supra note 7, at 1376 (“Assuming that natural and human threats are equal in 
coerciveness, the immediate actors’ blameworthiness are also equal, as their opportunities to act 
lawfully were equally constrained. The MPC and the common law, therefore, wrongly limit 
duress to human threats.”); Frankfurt, supra note 35, at 83 (noting that there is no difference in 
undermining free will between human and natural threats). 
 65. This hypothetical originates from Kadish and Schulhofer. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET 
AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 934 (9th ed. 2012). 
 66. See FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 191, 193 (discussing compulsive pressure that arises 
from situational duress and noting that “[w]e can think of natural events like rockslides and 
hurricanes as also posing ‘threats’”). 
 67. See supra note 64. 
 68. Berman, supra note 1, at 65. 
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entitled to touch your person or property without your consent.69 If he does 
so, then, ceteris paribus, he violates your rights.70 
Consent is the dropping of this right of non-interference.71 This is not all 
out forfeiture but merely the lowering of a normative fence, allowing the 
other person to now cross one’s boundaries. Consent also differs from 
requests. Requests, such as “come to my house for a dinner party,” are not 
just consent (dropping a claim right) but also providing a positive reason to 
engage in the action (I want you to eat dinner with me).72 
Theorists have generally debated whether consent is an internal act of 
acquiescence73 or a communicative act,74 or something in between.75 For our 
current purposes, let us roughly say that are two potential normative incidents 
for consent. The first is that the consenter chooses to allow the conduct. This 
act, even if internal, is critical to many understandings of consent.76 
The second is uptake. This is the idea that consent is not effective unless 
the consenter acquiesces and the consentee knows this fact. Those who take 
consent to be a communicative act care quite a bit about uptake and find an 
analogy in promising. Promising and consent are normative powers that point 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 69. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (“[A]ny unlawful or unauthorized 
touching of the person of another, except it be in the spirit of pleasantry, constitutes an assault 
and battery.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Victor Tadros formulates the mechanics of consent thus: 
Typically, when X owes a consent-sensitive duty to Y not to v: 
1) X owes a duty to Y not to v; 
2) Y can release X from this duty by consenting to X ving. 
3) If X vs without Y’s consent, X wrongs Y; but not if Y consents. 
TADROS, supra note 39, at 204; see also Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL 
THEORY 121, 124 (1996) (“By consenting to another’s touch, one puts that person at liberty to do 
what it was antecedently obligatory of her not to do.”). 
 72. Feinberg calls these cases “consent in the strong sense.” FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 
178. 
 73. E.g., Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165, 165–66 
(1996) (arguing consent is “a subjective mental state” of “choos[ing] to forgo or waive one’s 
moral objection to the boundary crossing”); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and 
the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405 (2016) (arguing that if consent is about 
autonomy that autonomy is best respected through a mental act view). 
 74. DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 4 (1998) (arguing consent should be understood as 
a “performative”); FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 174 (mental states are mere “dispositional 
consent”); Tom Dougherty, Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
224, 236 (2015) (arguing that consent is like releasing someone from a promise which must be 
communicated to be effective). 
 75. E.g., TADROS, supra note 39, at 209 (consent requires “an attempt to communicate”). 
 76. See supra note 73. 
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in opposite directions. Consenting waives a duty someone owes to you, thus 
granting that person a liberty. In contrast, promising is creating a new 
obligation that you owe to that other person.77 Hence, promises require not 
just that the promisor make the promise but also that the promisee accept it.78 
For instance, Charles Fried argues that if someone wrote you a postcard 
promising to have no more than two children, and you had never met this 
person, you might not want to take on the burden of someone owing you 
something.79 Accordingly, you might refuse acceptance. A promise 
whispered to your child, whom you know to be sleeping, is more akin to a 
silent vow than the creation of a duty to that child.80 To these theorists, 
consent also requires a similar communicated act.81 
The focus on both the consenter’s acquiescence, as well as the consentee’s 
uptake, yields that we care about the actions and choices of both the consenter 
and the consentee. Indeed, even when there is subjective acquiescence or 
communication, that acquiescence or communication can be defeated by 
force, fraud, or incapacity.82 Fiona’s enthusiastic “yes” is meaningless if it is 
procured by the point of a gun. To some scholars and courts, assent (the 
mental act or communication) does not become consent if there is force, 
fraud, or incapacity.83 To others, this is consent but not valid consent.84 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 77. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 178 (“The immediate effect of promises is to create 
obligations in the speaker; the immediate effect of acts of consent is to cancel obligations in the 
one addressed.”). 
 78. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 297 (1990) (“The metaphor ‘give 
one’s word’ itself suggests that issuing an invitation is not enough: the invitation has to be 
received, and indeed accepted . . . . [T]here is no giving one’s word unless there is ‘uptake’, which 
includes accepting as well as receiving.”). 
 79. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 41 (1981). 
 80. Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1603, 1620 (2009) (“Rather than making a genuine promise, a merely subjective promisor, who 
subjectively intends to promise but fails to communicate that intent to his promisee, performs the 
moral equivalent of a silent vow.”). 
 81. See Dougherty, supra note 74, at 234 (“Connecting promise and consent offers us 
leverage with the debate about whether consent must be communicated. No one seriously debates 
whether a noncommunicated intention is enough to create a promissory duty. We can exploit this 
point when theorizing consent.”). 
 82. WESTEN, supra note 35, at 180 (arguing that “freedom, knowledge, and 
competence . . . together constitute what legislatures and courts mean in requiring that attitudinal 
consent be ‘voluntary’”). 
 83. See Ferzan & Westen, supra note 10, at 766 (arguing that consent requires two steps—
whether the consenter signaled “assent” and whether it was given under sufficient conditions of 
freedom, knowledge, and capacity). 
 84. For example, Westen uses the example of the Travis County rapist, where the victim, 
threatened with a knife, “agrees” to intercourse if the rapist uses a condom. The grand jury did 
not indict. Westen notes the possible confusion of grand jurors in that the victim clearly chose to 
have intercourse over being killed (and thus consented under one understanding) but failed the 
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Although I will use the term “consent” to denote the mental act or 
communication, there are good normative arguments for restricting the usage 
of the term to only those instances in which the mental act or communication 
is successful in changing rights and duties.85 
II. CONSENT AND COERCION 
A. Two Forms of Coercion and Consent 
1. Consent and CoercionE 
Let us now turn to the question of how Berman’s view intersects with 
consent, and let us begin with coercionE. Consent procured by gunpoint is 
ineffective. Moreover, it seems that at least one reason why it is ineffective 
is because the consenter lacks the appropriate range of choices. 
At the outset, we must make an important change to our nomenclature. 
Berman’s focus on when coercionE is “E”—that is, when it excuses—is under 
inclusive. At one point, he does adopt a slightly more capacious view that 
coercionE “serves to release her from or reduce the demands of a normative 
obligation.”86 The concept we are after is when it is responsibility defeating 
because of the impaired choice. But we wouldn’t say that the consenter is 
being excused. Rather, the idea here the coercion renders the consent 
ineffective such that the consenter does not drop the claim right. 
Because both excuse and this concept of coercion are about rendering 
choices defective, Berman’s coercionE is better understood as defeating the 
typical normative results of that choice.87 Ultimately, it is not that the 
consenter is being released from the obligation. Rather, the obligation never 
existed because the consenter’s assent was never morally or legally 
efficacious in the first place.88 The claim right was never waived, or the duty 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
second layer of analysis because she only “consented” under duress and thus the consent should 
not have been morally or legally effective. WESTEN, supra note 35, at 1–2, 180. 
 85. Heidi Hurd claims that “coerced consent is no consent at all.” Heidi M. Hurd, Was the 
Frog Prince Sexually Molested?: A Review of Peter Westen’s The Logic of Consent, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 86. Berman, supra note 1, at 60. 
 87. For the argument that defects in consent are akin to defects in choices, see Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan, Clarifying Consent: Peter Westen’s The Logic of Consent, 25 L. & PHIL. 193, 
204–11 (2006). 
 88. Indeed, compare in the context of promises, which Berman more fully considers, the 
view that a coerced promise is not a promise at all. See THOMSON, supra note 78, at 315 (“Where 
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was never created. That is, we should relabel coercionE as coercionC.89 The 
form of coercion we are after is “choice undermining,” and I will use 
coercionC to designate this function. Something can be choice undermining 
and then excuse or it can be choice undermining such that a promise or 
consent never existed in the first instance. 
There are incredibly difficult questions here about how choice-impacting 
the coercion must be. This is true with duress as well. But our concepts for 
duress do not immediately translate to consent. This is because duress 
requires a further wrong—the harm is externalized to a third party. Consent 
does not operate like duress because the coerced act is internalized to the 
coercee. When you consent in the face of coercion, the unwanted harm falls 
on you. For this reason, threats that would be insufficient for duress might 
still overwhelm fair choices when the harm is totally internalized. Still, to the 
extent that both duress and coercion are about when choices are deemed 
involuntary, it should not surprise us to see parity between the formulations.90 
Although I cannot explicate all possible formulations here (nor need I do 
so for our purposes),91 consider the current draft revisions to the Model Penal 
Code sexual assault provisions on coercion: 
SECTION 213.3. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY COERCION OR 
EXPLOITATION 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the uptake is a fault in the word-receiver, we can think of the claim as stillborn, forfeit from 
conception.”); Eric Chwang, On Coerced Promises, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS 156, 157 
(Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011) (arguing that coerced promises have no moral or predictive force). 
 89. Berman’s discussion suggests that he would willingly take this claim on board. See, e.g., 
Berman, supra note 1, at 66 (suggesting that with respect to his argument’s application to 
promises, “the difficulty might lie not with the contention that coercion claims serve two discrete 
normative functions . . . , but with my definition of coercionE.”). 
 90. Cf. Hurd, supra note 71, at 140 (defending identity between these formulations because 
“just as limiting a defendant’s choices may render his choice insufficiently autonomous to be 
praiseworthy or blameworthy, so limiting a victim’s choices may render her choice insufficiently 
autonomous to have moral force”). 
 91. Cf. ARCHARD, supra note 74, at 50 (arguing that coercion undermines consent when 
“the consequences threatened . . . are significant, proximate, and real”). Notably, Archard argues 
that legally it is impossible to articulate a particular standard for coercion: 
Again the unreasonableness of the alternative threatened may be judged in 
various terms: as a function only of its awfulness in itself, of the awfulness of 
complying (assuming the threatened alternative is worse), of how much worse 
it is than what is demanded, and of how awful the situation as a whole—only 
either compliance or threatened consequences—is. Given these complications 
it may be impossible to specify any clear and agreed criteria whereby the point 
at which a choice is less than fully voluntary possesses that degree of 
involuntariness which invalidates any consent given. 
Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). 
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(1) Sexual Assault by Coercion. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault 
by Coercion if he or she recklessly causes another person to engage 
in or submit to an act of sexual penetration or oral sex by explicitly 
or implicitly: 
(a) using or threatening to use physical force against that person or 
anyone else; or 
(b) threatening to accuse that person or anyone else of a criminal 
offense or of a failure to comply with immigration regulations; or 
(c) threatening to take or withhold action as an official, or cause an 
official to take or withhold action; or 
(d) making any other threat that would cause submission to or 
engagement in such act by an individual of ordinary resolution in 
that person’s situation under all the circumstances as that person 
believes them to be.92 
Although much of this provision is ripe for discussion,93 consider 
subsection (d), which requires a threat that would cause a person of ordinary 
resolution to yield. Under this formulation, juries will need to resolve 
contested normative judgments about the degree of the threat to determine 
whether sexual assault by coercion has occurred. 
Irrespective of the proper formulation, we can see that the question the 
jury must answer is one that focuses on coercionC—it is about whether the 
consenter’s choice was under such pressure that it should no longer count as 
a choice, that is, as the giving of legally valid consent. 
2. Consent and CoercionW 
Because our goal is not to delineate the exact limits of coercionC, let me 
turn to coercionW. CoercionW cases entail that it is the coercer’s conduct that 
is morally relevant, as opposed to the coercee’s choice. The David and 
Charles example above is an example where there is no duress, but there is a 
wrongful threat.94 
Now, sometimes this wrongful threat just looks like its own crime, and so 
we might wonder what the conceptual payoff is to calling this other threat 
“coercion.” If A threatens to kill B’s dog unless B has sex with A, and B 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3 2017). 
 93. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hanus, Rape by Nonphysical Coercion: State v. Brooks, 64 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1141, 1174–75 (2016) (criticizing an earlier draft of the MPC and advocating a broader 
formulation). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 62–63. 
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refuses, we might wonder what additional insight we gain by saying that A 
coerced (or attempted to coerce) B. 
However, there are cases in which the term “coercion” does have 
conceptual payoff, and part of the benefit of Berman’s teachings is that we 
can independently focus on coercionW and thus we can stop looking for the 
coercionE. One instance in which Berman claims this is true is 
unconstitutional conditions.95 Coerced confessions may implicate just 
coercionW as well. That is, Berman notes that sometimes the point is not that 
the coercee’s rights were so limited, but that as a matter of political morality, 
the state cannot use the confession because it employed coercionW.96 In other 
words, there may be a gap between the threats that constitute coercionW 
(because any wrongful threat can satisfy that) and threats that meet coercionC 
(because these threats must place a certain amount of pressure, both 
psychologically and in terms of magnitude, so as to warrant the judgment that 
the choice was not morally or legally efficacious). Thus, we may deploy the 
term “coercion” when our focus is simply on coercionW cases. 
B. Illuminating the Aziz Ansari Debate 
We now have two types of coercion. CoercionC which directly implicates 
the wrong of rape because the victim does not drop her claim right against 
being touched. And coercionW, where the victim does drop the claim right, 
but the coercer’s behavior is still wrongful.97 
With two different concepts of coercion available for deployment, let us 
look at the Aziz Ansari debate. Some critics have denounced Ansari as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 95. Berman, supra note 3, at 41–42 (arguing that the magnitude of coercive pressure is 
relevant to coercionE but not coercionW and that unconstitutional conditions cases should be 
focusing on the latter). 
 96. Berman, supra note 1, at 72–73 n.73 (discussing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
170 (1986), and the Court’s focus on police overreaching, not involuntariness). This is also how 
Berman explains Harry Frankfurt’s example: 
The courts may refuse to admit in evidence, on the grounds that it was coerced, 
a confession which the police have obtained from a prisoner by threatening to 
beat him. But the prisoner’s accomplices, who are compromised by the 
confession, are less likely to agree that he was genuinely coerced into 
confession. 
Id.; see also Frankfurt, supra note 35, at 65. To Berman this is a case of coercionW but not 
coercionE. 
 97. It is, of course, possible that both types can be at play, and may indeed figure in to many 
instances of coerced sex. That, however, does not undermine that they each can perform distinct 
functions with respect to consent. 
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sexual assaulter.98 His callous, boorish behavior aimed to induce sex, they 
claim. Others have been surprised that we can so easily deny women 
agency.99 If a man is pestering you for sex, you have a very easy way to end 
it, they say: leave. The aim of this section is to show how employing both 
concepts of coercion can reveal how both sides of this debate might be right. 
They might simply be talking past each other. 
1. CoercionC 
Let’s start with coercionC. The proponents of the “just leave” approach are 
making coercionC claims. Surely, we would never excuse someone from 
wrongdoing because her boyfriend pestered her or relentlessly whined, and 
so forth. And even if coercionC is importantly distinct in how it applies to 
internalizing harms when one consents, as opposed to externalizing harms 
onto third parties in the face of duress, it seems hard to say that one person’s 
oral advocacy is the sort of behavior that limits another person’s options in a 
truly choice undermining way. 
With coercionC, it is important to recognize that most choices are 
constrained to some extent and most involve tradeoffs.100 I am tabling the 
question of whether society is so inherently patriarchal that consensual 
heterosexual sex is impossible.101 If we think that, then this project fails at the 
inception as there is no line to be drawn. And as we approach this question, 
we ought to take seriously that whatever we take to be coercive (as coercionW 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 98. See sources cited supra note 28. 
 99. See sources cited supra notes 26–27. 
 100. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 53, at 191 (arguing “it is a mistake to think that difficult 
circumstances and inequalities should be regarded as invalidating consent in either morality or 
law. To the contrary. It is scarcity and constraints that explain the need for morally transformative 
consent . . . .”). 
 101. This idea goes back as far as Mill. See 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 579 (7th ed., London, 
Savill, Edwards and Co., 1871) (1848): 
[T]he law makes everything which the wife acquires, the property of her 
husband, while by compelling her to live with him it forces her to submit to 
almost any amount of moral and even physical tyranny which he may choose 
to inflict, there is some ground for regarding every act done by her as done 
under coercion . . . . 
It is famously defended by Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. See e.g., CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 175–76 (1989); ANDREA DWORKIN, 
INTERCOURSE 124–126, 137 (1987). 
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or coercionC) is not behavior on which men have a monopoly. Women, too, 
can wheedle, whine, and cajole to get what they want.102 
But back to the question of what sort of coercion is required for coercionC. 
Consider the following case from Sarah Conly: 
A woman may want to . . . express love, even if she is not physically 
aroused. Perhaps she is tired, but her husband is leaving town for a 
two-week trip, and she wants to have sex to feel closer to him. 
Perhaps she even wants to do it just because he wants to do it. He 
has read a lot of feminist literature, however, and is a sensitive guy 
and won’t sulk or become angry if she doesn’t have sex; he just 
won’t feel as happy as he would if she did. She loves him, however, 
and wants him to feel loved. Even in the latter case, where his 
attitude contributes to her decision—where indeed, were it not for 
his desire she wouldn’t want to have sex—her having sex doesn’t 
plausibly seem to be rape, any more than my buying Girl Scout 
cookies only to avoid hurting the feelings of the little girl selling 
them means I’ve been robbed.103 
As this example reveals, consent doesn’t require unbridled enthusiasm or 
unrestrained choice to be morally efficacious. It also does not require that the 
consenter want or desire the act independent of the other person’s wants and 
needs. Indeed, given that consent plays a role in all sorts of activities beyond 
sex, there are myriad other instances in which consent or some other choice 
is not the product of unbridled enthusiasm and yet is sufficiently autonomous. 
You aren’t excited to have your appendix out. You would certainly rather not 
have appendicitis. You might not be having sex with your partner if you were 
smarter and better looking; you’d be with Heidi Klum instead. As most 
families know, there are constant debates about where to go for dinner. 
Sometimes everyone is up for pizza, and sometimes not. But being part of a 
group sometimes means eating at your second-choice restaurant. In our quest 
to condemn abusive relationships and unhealthy ones, we ought not to set up 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 102. See Scott A. Anderson, Sex Under Pressure: Jerks, Boorish Behavior, and Gender 
Hierarchy, 11 RES PUBLICA 349, 359 (2005): 
The sort of pressures that we are concerned with here—wheedling, whining, 
guilt-tripping, and pressing beyond the bounds of decorum—would seem to 
be equal-opportunity techniques, available to women as much as to men. And, 
if some recent scholarly studies can be trusted, there is evidence that many 
younger women these days are also willing to use pressures of various sorts to 
encourage reluctant men to acquiesce to sex or sexual attentions. 
However, Anderson also notes that studies reveal that men and women often react to unwelcome 
sexual advances quite differently. Id. at 367–68. 
 103. Sarah Conly, Seduction, Rape, and Coercion, 115 ETHICS 96, 103 (2004). 
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unrealistic expectations as to what morally healthy consent entails. 
Unconstrained choice is a mirage.104 
Determining the contours of coercionC is itself a difficult project, then. It 
is about the kind of threats that are sufficiently restraining and place sufficient 
pressure that we believe that consent no longer exists. It is a normative 
judgment about where the person of ordinary firmness lies. 
How do we assess Grace? There are myriad reasons why a woman might 
succumb to sex in the face of boorish persistence. One reason converts this 
type of behavior to a coercionC question—she might be afraid. The woman 
who repeatedly declines advances and is met with steadfast persistence may 
worry that her choices are either to succumb or to see force escalate. Being 
alone in a secluded area with someone you don’t know well who is bigger 
and stronger than you can be scary. And if that is the case, then these cases 
are actually about the parameters of coercionC.105 
To be clear, in the Ansari case, there was no claim that Grace was afraid. 
She was annoyed, exhausted, disappointed, and disgusted. She was 
overwrought. So, this isn’t a case in which the operative motivation was fear. 
In contrast, another reason for submission takes this out of the realm of 
coercionC. Women may like the men they are with—why else wind up alone 
at his place? And so, they are trying to walk a delicate balance of saying no, 
but saying it in a way that continues the relationship. If a man repeatedly 
whined and asked you to kill your neighbor, you’d dump him (or you should 
dump him). But the difficulties of determining how to decline intimacy while 
simultaneously attempting to further an intimate relationship are far tougher 
to navigate. The need to be a delicate negotiator, however, is not coercionC. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 104. Cf. TADROS, supra note 39, at 214 (observing that consent may negate the wrongdoing 
without making the act valuable). 
 105. Cf. Anderson, supra note 102, at 366: 
Even if men and women were equally likely to resort to boorish behavior to 
achieve their sexual ends, men are known to turn sometimes to much more 
potent and dangerous techniques than women typically are, and men are 
generally able to fend off the relatively few women who might be inclined to 
use such techniques themselves. Hence the ability to apply pressure to have 
unwanted sex may differ markedly between men and women on average. Men 
are able to pressure women more effectively because their pressure is backed 
by their much greater ability to escalate that pressure into the range of the very 
dangerous. 
See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 53, at 187 (noting that these cases are not cases of verbal 
coercion because it is the physical force doing the normative work). 
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Your choice is not undermined just because you are trying to manage two 
opposing forces.106 
Here, it seems we are hard pressed to explain how Grace’s choice was 
undermined. Verbal and peer pressure can affect us, but unless the “all my 
friends were doing it” and every other form of peer pressure are about to 
become defenses, we can expect people to live up to certain expectations and 
to repel and withstand certain forces. As Heidi Hurd argues: 
A woman who acquiesces to sex because she fears that she will not 
be asked out on another date, or because she seeks to avoid 
embarrassment, appears pathetic precisely because she is willing to 
sacrifice an important interest to avoid a fairly trivial threat. Do such 
pathetic choices manifest a lack of autonomy? Or are they pathetic 
precisely because they are the product of autonomous choice? On 
pain of declaring all bad choices nonautonomous, one must be 
cautious about excusing defendants who do bad deeds as a result of 
pathetic choices, and one must be cautious about declaring plaintiffs 
insufficiently autonomous when they are prepared to sacrifice 
important interests to avoid trivial losses.107 
Although Hurd’s deployment of “pathetic” is jarring, it underscores her 
point that not all bad choices ought to be undone, simply because they are 
bad choices. Otherwise, we would have a paternalistic state that does not 
allow us to make mistakes. And sometimes our mistakes are our own. 
It is discomforting to reach the conclusion that Grace was not coerced. But 
abandoning coercion altogether would be too hasty. The fact that cases like 
Ansari’s may not be instances of coercionC is not the end of the matter. We 
still have to ask the coercionW question. Was the behavior wrongful in a 
condemnable way? That is, the feminist response that Grace should have just 
left is talking past the feminist response that Ansari engaged in wrongful 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 106. In the New York Times’ 45 Stories of Sex and Consent on Campus, a surprising number 
of the explanations of consent seemed to follow this pattern. Consider two: Meaghan, New York, 
in response to a question to ascertain affirmative consent says “yeah” because: “[y]ou’ve let it go 
too far now, I thought. It would be rude to stop him”; and Rachel, New York reported: 
You read stories of rape and sexual assault but never about your own manners 
pressuring you into having sex. Sometimes you just don’t want to have sex 
after all the buildup but there is no way to get out of it without coming off as 
rude or disappointing your partner, who is probably a good person, not some 
creepy dude in a club.  
Jessica Bennett & Daniel Jones, 45 Stories of Sex and Consent on Campus, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/10/style/sexual-consent-college-
campus.html.  
 107. Hurd, supra note 71, at 143. 
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behavior. Defeating coercionC is insufficient to resolve the question of 
coercion. We still need to work through coercionW. 
2. CoercionW 
If the threats do not rise to the level of constituting coercionC, might we 
still say that the coercer wronged the coercee because of the presence of 
coercionW? We need a wrongful threat. Let me begin with instances in which 
it is clear that the threat is an instance of coercionW before I turn to where I 
believe the Ansari incident leads us—to an examination of what kinds of 
threats are wrongful in relationships. 
Can a threat be wrongful without giving rise to coercionC? Surely this is 
true. Heidi Malm gives the example of the boyfriend who says, “have sex 
with me or I will kill your goldfish.”108 Flushing someone’s pet down the 
toilet is wrong. But a person of ordinary resistance would direct the boyfriend 
to the bathroom before surrendering sex. From the law’s point of view, there 
is no coercionC. 
I suspect most people find it hard to believe this threat could happen. 
However, adjust the hypothetical to downgrade the sexual act requested, and 
I suspect you could reach a point where despite the fact that a person of 
reasonable firmness would not give in, you can imagine someone who would. 
Or consider Cameron, whose buddy Ferris says that he will flush Cameron’s 
goldfish down the toilet unless Cameron gives Ferris the keys to Cameron’s 
dad’s Ferrari. Clearly, the father would not find Cameron to be excused 
because of the goldfish threat. But it seems equally clear that Ferris should 
not make the threat (and, as I will soon argue, he also should not drive the 
car).109 
Of course, we understand why threatening to kill someone’s pet is 
wrongful. The question is whether Ansari’s behavior constitutes a wrongful 
threat or something that can fall within coercionW. To make sense of this, we 
might consider two types of cases that Conly analyzes in Seduction, Rape, 
and Coercion.110 First, someone can threaten to end a relationship.111 This is 
not what Ansari did, but this sort of behavior is often discussed in the same 
category as Ansari’s. Second and more directly comparable to Ansari’s case, 
someone can cajole and wheedle to get what he wants.112 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 108. H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law of Rape, 
2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 153 (1996). 
 109. See infra Section III. 
 110. Conly, supra note 103, at 107. 
 111. Id. at 108. 
 112. Id. at 114–16. 
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Before analyzing these cases, however, note that what is important here 
are not the answers, but the questions. What we ought to notice about these 
cases is that the debate is about the terms of the relationship and what can be 
wrongful within a relation. The claim—“it is wrong on a date to repeatedly 
ask a woman to touch your penis after she has said no”—is not a claim about 
whether she can simply say “no,” or “put that away” or “I am out of here.” 
We should assume she can. And we should assume, therefore, that there is no 
coercionC. Her acquiescence is sufficiently free.113 The question, though, is 
whether his behavior is wrong. 
The kinds of coercion that are wrongful depend upon the relationship.114 
An employer may threaten to fire an employee if she does not stop playing 
videogames, but the employer may not threaten to fire the employee unless 
she stops rooting for a particular basketball team.115 As Conly notes, “[t]here 
are ways we can bend others to our will and ways we can’t, and what these 
are seem to be determined by the nature of the specific relationship.”116 
Conly suggests that threatening a break up unless the partner has sex does 
not constitute wrongful coercion as no one is morally obligated to stay in a 
relationship.117 Conly instead argues that part of being in a relationship is 
being able to craft the relationship you want.118 Conly rejects that a 
relationship, although grounding various duties, grounds a duty to stay. One 
may need to help one’s alcoholic partner, but one is not required to stay with 
him; even if he is suicidal, Conly maintains that one’s duties do not extend to 
a requirement to stay in the relationship.119 
Conly admits that there can be conditions that are illegitimate: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 113. In this respect, Conly is asking the wrong question because she consistently jumps from 
the question of whether the act is wrongful coercion to whether it can constitute rape. See, e.g., 
id. at 96 (“The question here, however, is whether he is also a rapist.”); id. at 103 (“Yet, it seems 
implausible to say that whenever someone . . . has sex only out of fear of displeasing 
someone . . . a rape has occurred.); id. at 107 (“If [after having been threatened with a pinch if she 
does not have sex with him] she concedes to his wishes, we will probably think she didn’t really 
mind having sex to begin with, even given the uncouthness of his advance. We won’t think she 
was raped.”); id. at 108 (“Reflection shows that, while the second of these may be less than 
admirable, neither case constitutes rape.”). We might wish for more nuance in our judgments 
about the impact of coercionW in the absence of coercionC. Despite her focus on rape, one 
conclusion Conly does draw is that “[t]o subsume all areas of sexual wrong under the heading of 
rape does a disservice to all concerned.” Id. at 121. 
 114. Id. at 107. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 108, 110. 
 118. Id. at 108–09. 
 119. Id. at 109–10. 
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Demands placed within a relationship should have reasonable 
bearing on the health of the relationship, and should not be 
inherently immoral, and sanctions offered for failure to meet even 
reasonable demands are limited. I am assuming, however, that 
engaging in sex, all things being equal, is not immoral and has 
reasonable bearing on the relationship . . . .120 
But we ought to ask exactly what we think the relationship is and what the 
content of the demand is. If we are to imagine that two twenty-two-year-olds 
are in a three-year relationship, and the woman has decided that she wants to 
save sex until marriage, it is certainly true that the man can say that sexual 
compatibility is something that is important to him before marriage. If a 
husband decides he no longer finds his wife attractive and never wishes to 
have sex with her, she, too, can leave. On the other hand, how much of a 
claim does a relationship have to a demand of sex on any particular night 
backed by the threat of exit? Partners may negotiate all sorts of things over 
any period of time, and the failure to change or be compatible may mean the 
relationship ought to end. But it would be odd to think that anyone may 
simply demand that a dish be done, that the trash be taken out, or that sex be 
engaged in, on a particular occasion with a threat of exit. That is, a threat of 
exit might be a disproportionate demand on any single occasion. 
Accordingly, rather than deem exit as always being a legitimate consequence 
within the coercer’s rights, we ought to ask whether exit is appropriate as a 
consequence to this particular demand. There is more discussion to be had 
about the contours of coercionW. 
As to cases like Ansari’s, Conly also reaches the same conclusion—that 
there is no wrong—when the coercer deploys negative emotional sanctions. 
For this, she uses Cousin Beau who asks you to invest in a business 
opportunity: 
He stresses his own suffering, hearkens back to the many times he’s 
helped you, and suggests that he can’t possibly feel the same in the 
future if you won’t do this little thing, which can’t possibly hurt you 
and which could help him so much. You feel guilty, you feel sorry, 
you feel Beau may turn against you if you fail him, and, most of all, 
you feel confused. The more Beau sees this, the harder he pushes.121 
Though Conly concludes that Beau is “a sleaze,” she takes him to be 
neither a thief nor an extortionist.122 And, she concludes, he has not gone 
“beyond [his] rights” because the nature of family relationships includes that 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 120. Id. at 110. 
 121. Id. at 114. 
 122. Id. at 115. 
50:0951] CONSENT AND COERCION 979 
we are vulnerable to them and they are “allowed” to use “the strength of 
family ties to their own ends.”123 
Again, the reach of this example may be more nuanced than Conly takes 
it to be. Parents and children (even grown children) use guilt as a weapon all 
the time, and yet it seems that every promise to come home for Thanksgiving 
that is procured by some parental guilt is not invalid. On the other hand, it 
does seem that if Beau’s needling became excessive, there would be a point 
at which Grandma Greta might tell Beau to give his cousin back the money, 
as he cannot accept something achieved by such emotional blackmail. There 
is a point at which it would be wrong for him to push you and wrong for him 
to accept the money. 
Admittedly, in none of these cases are the threatened acts crimes. Berman 
has suggested that each realm has its own terms.124 For this reason, he thinks 
that unconstitutional conditions cases can be instances of coercion, despite 
the fact that the government could simply deny the benefit altogether.125 Other 
scholars have also noticed that what counts as “wrongful” for purposes of 
coercion may be relative to morality, or a relationship, as opposed to law.126 
This sort of move—that within a relationship new norms can be set and the 
baseline for one practice is not the baseline for another—may mean that we 
can wrong each other relative to the terms of a relationship. And, the law does 
piggyback on these relationships; the kind of wrongful threat necessary in 
contract law is not a threat that is otherwise prohibited by law.127 Indeed, 
Wertheimer seems open to the following case being a threat: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 123. Id. 
 124. Berman, supra note 1, at 55. 
Because my explication of coercionW—like other “moralized” resolutions—
neither presupposes nor supplies any particular content to one’s obligations 
(whether ethical, political, constitutional, or what-have-you), all we can 
conclude for certain is that the conditional threat is coerciveW in a normative 
discourse in which the act threatened would be impermissible.  
Id.; see also Carr, supra note 35, at 64 (arguing that interpersonal relationships have their own 
conventions and they establish “the conditions under which it is socially permissible to leverage 
another’s choice menu”). 
 125. Berman, supra note 1, at 53–55. 
 126. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 31 (“A’s threat can be wrongful—and therefore 
constitute duress—even if A threatens to do something which is not otherwise illegal”). 
 127. See Smith, supra note 2, at 351–52. 
Yet the fact that for policy reasons certain wrongful behaviour is not deemed 
a tort or a crime does not mean that it should not count as wrongful for the 
purposes of determining contractual validity. The pragmatic considerations 
weigh differently. A refusal to enforce a contract is typically less serious than 
a finding of criminal or tortious liability, especially when the possibility of 
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The Drug Case. A is B’s normal supplier of illegal drugs for $20 
per day. One day, A proposes to B that he will supply B’s drugs if 
and only if B beats up C.128 
Although Wertheimer articulates Nozick’s conclusion that this is an offer 
if one is using a moralized baseline as A has no duty to supply B with drugs, 
Wertheimer is not so sure.129 He notes, “even if the drug relationship is 
immoral from an external perspective [A’s moral perspective], it is arguable 
that within that relationship, A is morally required to continue to supply B 
with drugs, perhaps at no more than the market price.”130 In other words, 
relationships dictate what we may and may not ask of each other.131 
Where does this leave us with respect to Ansari? It leaves us with a 
normative debate. What are the proper terms of a first date? What can we 
expect of each other? What forms of persuasion are right and which ones are 
wrong? Why? It is not my aim to answer these questions. Rather, my aim is 
to show that these questions play their own distinct role in our analysis of 
coerced sex, and accordingly, there is room for robust normative debate. Even 
if we concede that Grace could have left, we can still condemn Ansari. 
C. What Follows from CoercionW Without CoercionC 
My goal in this Article has been to open up the conceptual space to 
recognize that coercionW and coercionC may both impact wrongdoing. Thus, 
the failure of coercionC to undermine consent does not entail that the coercer 
has not engaged in wrongdoing. And those who argue that what Ansari did 
is, or should be considered to be, wrong, are arguing about the parameters of 
coercionW. 
Some instances of coercionW are already criminal. On the other hand, we 
know that there are myriad behaviors that are wrongful, but are not 
criminalized. It is wrong to break a promise. It is wrong to lie. Our criminal 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
non-contractual protection of the plaintiff is taken into account (e.g., 
restitution). For this reason, there is in principle a gap between what is 
unlawful generally and what is wrongful behaviour in a contractual situation—
as English courts recognise.  
Id. 
 128. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 209. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 209 n.27 (alteration in original). 
 131. But see SCHULHOFER, supra note 36, at 123–24 (arguing that the relevant category is 
one’s legal entitlements). 
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law is not co-extensive with what is morally wrongful.132 Some coercionW 
behavior lies at this boundary. And, if and how we might criminalize such 
behavior involves complicated questions of political morality. 
In Part IV, I will return to the criminalization question. There is, however, 
a separate and distinct normative implication of coercionW, an implication 
Berman failed to see. And, so, before turning to the questions about how the 
criminal law ought to regulate coercionW, we should first understand the more 
significant question that follows from finding coercionW. 
III. CONSENT AND COERCION REVISITED: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
COERCER’S WRONGDOING 
One worry about my analysis to this juncture is that I seem to be missing 
the point. The Grace-defenders may say the following: It is not just wrong to 
issue a threat to get sex. It is wrong to have the sex that issues from the threat. 
Or, there is a difference between “coercion” and “coerced sex.” 
That’s right. There is more to say. In this Part, I will argue that even in the 
absence of coercionC, there is a wrong, a distinct wrong, in having sex that is 
the result of a wrongful threat—even if that threat is not choice-undermining 
and even if we think that only choice-undermining instances of coercion are 
the wrong of rape. This might simply be a different wrong. 
The idea here is that as a result of the coercer’s wrongdoing, he is not 
entitled to avail himself of the consent. Although I will break this down more 
precisely in what follows, consider the following hypothetical case (which 
involves neither coercion nor consent): 
Doug and John are sitting in a park. Admiring Doug’s laptop, John 
proceeds to point out to Doug the numerous socio-economically 
disadvantaged children around him. He points out that Doug has a hefty 
salary and a home computer and that maybe Doug should do something good 
for others. And because he doesn’t donate to Oxfam, the least Doug can do 
is leave his laptop here in the park for someone to find it. Now, John warns 
Doug, there is certainly a chance that the person who takes it won’t be needy, 
but this is just a good, morally meaningful risk to run, irrespective of who 
takes the laptop. Doug is sold. He leaves his laptop with a note that says, 
“Whoever sees this note may have this laptop.” Doug and John leave, but on 
their way to the parking lot, John says he left a book on the picnic table. John 
doubles back, takes the laptop as he had planned all along, and returns. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 132. See Leo Katz, Villainy and Felony: A Problem Concerning Criminalization, 6 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 451, 455–56 (2002) (questioning why the sorts of villains in literature are often not 
felons according to the criminal law). 
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Just as we reject coercionC in many circumstances, there is nothing to 
undermine the efficacy of Doug’s choice. He even knew he was running the 
risk that a wealthy person would take the laptop. He voluntarily relinquished 
it. This counts as abandonment.133 And, if anyone else in the park had taken 
the laptop, he would have no claim to take it back. But there seems to be 
something awry with John getting the laptop. It seems as though his deceptive 
behavior should prevent the property right from vesting in him, even though 
Doug’s behavior abandons his rights in rem. Anyone else can acquire it. But 
not John. 
It is John’s wrongful conduct that supports the intuitive conclusion that he 
is prevented from availing himself of the abandonment just as a coercer’s 
wrongful behavior may prevent him from availing himself of the consent. 
That would mean that there might be more to say about Ansari’s behavior 
than just that he is a wrongful cad. Ansari might be what I am calling 
“normatively impaired.” That means that because of his wrongdoing, he 
cannot avail himself of consent. 
The normative impairment of the coercer thus derives from both a 
wrongful act and the fact that this wrongful act caused the consent. This idea 
is woefully undertheorized, and yet, it is a legally recognized principle.134 It 
is most famously expounded in Riggs v. Palmer, in which Elmer murdered 
his grandfather before the grandfather could change his will and disinherit 
Elmer.135 The court held the murderer could not inherit because he would 
profit from this wrong.136 
This Part begins by further spelling out the contours of profiting from 
one’s own coercion. It then turns to other pockets of our law that also 
recognize this underlying moral principal. Some states adopt an objective 
approach to entrapment where it is the state’s conduct, and not the 
defendant’s predisposition, that determines whether the state is barred from 
prosecution.137 This principle is also at play in the law of unclean hands when 
it bars a plaintiff from recovering if the plaintiff’s wrongdoing plays a causal 
role in the current claim.138 
In such cases, the question is not what the grandfather’s will actually gave 
away, nor is it whether the defendant actually committed the offense, nor is 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 133. There is both an intention to abandon and an act of relinquishment. See Linscomb v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 199 F.2d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 1952); Cash v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 
177 Cal. Rptr. 474, 476 (Ct. App. 1981); 1 AM. JUR. 2D, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed 
Property § 10 (2018). 
 134. Burra, supra note 33, at 19 (noting the principle is “remarkably undertheorized”). 
 135. 22 N.E. 188, 188–89 (1889). 
 136. Id. at 191. 
 137. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 138. See infra Section III.B.2. 
50:0951] CONSENT AND COERCION 983 
it whether the defendant actually wronged the plaintiff. Rather, these 
questions are beside the point because the person’s claim arises from his own 
wrongdoing. The nephew killed to inherit, the police procured the crime, and 
the actor’s unclean hands tainted the cause of action. CoercionW tells us more 
than that it is wrong to threaten. Sometimes, it is also wrong to receive a 
benefit, even when coercionC is not present. 
A. The Wrong of Profiting from One’s Coercion 
Let’s start with a less controversial example than coerced sex. Tom 
Dougherty uses the following example in which you are asked by the 
passenger next to you on an airplane to borrow your pen to fill out the 
immigration form: 
Suppose your pen is a gift with a delicate nib that is easily damaged. 
You politely explain that you are unwilling to share it, but the 
passenger takes the news badly. Increasingly agitated, he starts to 
bicker and moan, and repeats his request again and again. You hate 
confrontation and want a quiet flight, so you give in and loan it to 
him. Since you’re consenting under some duress, this loan seems 
morally problematic. But it’d also be natural to say that the loan 
would be much more problematic if the passenger were coercing 
you with a threat of physical violence. 139 
The loan does indeed seem morally problematic. And this account 
explains why. The passenger’s needling you prevents him from availing 
himself of your consent. He is, as I argue, normatively impaired—he cannot 
take advantage of the typical normative effect of your consent. If we are 
barred from profiting from our wrongs, this should not turn on whether 
someone else’s choice is overwhelmed, but merely whether the wrongdoing 
caused the profit.140 He procured the consent via his wrongful threat, and that 
is sufficient to prevent him from availing himself of it. 
As this is a case of coercionW without robust coercionC, let me spend a 
moment on how this fits into the argument thus far. It means that for Ansari, 
there is a separate question than whether Grace was forced or could leave, or 
even whether she was emotionally overwrought. There is simply the question 
of whether Ansari’s behavior tainted his ability to avail himself of the 
consent. 
Now, because there is no coercionC, the consent does drop the claim right 
and there is no rape. The choice, from Grace’s side, is not undermined. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 139. Tom Dougherty, Degrees of Consent 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 140. See Burra, supra note 33, at 19 (relying on no profit from own wrong); id. at 22 
(employing a causal, not choice impairing, requirement). 
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wrong is not the harm or evil that is present in rape, but a distinct wrong in 
availing himself of a benefit that he obtained through his wrongful conduct. 
Similarly, the passenger on the plane does not violate your right; he just 
cannot benefit from your consent. 
The normative impairment of the coercer thus derives from both a 
wrongful act and the fact that this wrongful act caused the consent. The idea 
is not that this is free floating punishment for an earlier wrong, nor is it the 
wrong of having unconsented-to sex. Rather, the idea is that although the 
consenter’s conduct would normally change rights and duties, the coercion 
precludes the actor from availing herself of it.141 
B. Doctrinal Support 
To this point, I have gestured at the equitable doctrine of “no man profiting 
from his own wrong,” but this is a doctrine that is overtheorized in 
jurisprudence, having been famously deployed by Ronald Dworkin,142 and 
undertheorized, as a matter of what precisely grounds the normative 
impairment. Accordingly, to see this doctrine at work, it may be useful to 
travel to other areas—entrapment and unclean hands. That is, the kind of 
normative impairment I am discussing is alive and well in the law. It just 
takes a little uncovering. 
1. Entrapment 
Jurisdictions divide over the test for entrapment.143 For some, the question 
is whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense.144 In these 
jurisdictions, if the police officers cause the defendant to do something he 
would have done anyway, there is no defense.145 Other jurisdictions, however, 
adopt an objective test that focuses on police conduct, rather than on the 
predisposition of the criminal defendant.146 When police officers engage in 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 141. Cf. Alexander, supra note 73, at 171 (briefly gesturing in this direction before offering 
a different account). 
 142. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 29 (1977) (arguing “no man should 
profit from his own wrong” is a principle that is part of the law). 
 143. Paul Marcus, The Development of Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 5, 29 (1986). 
 144. Id. at 33–34 (noting many states followed the Supreme Court’s subjective view). 
 145. Id. at 17–18 (“Entrapment, by definition, encompasses the idea that the entrapped 
defendant is not predisposed to commit the crime.”). 
 146. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-237 (2018); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 12.1-5-11 (2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 313 (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (West 
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behavior that is deemed sufficiently wrongful or outrageous, and that conduct 
causes the offense, the defendant has a complete defense to the crime.147 It is 
the objective test that is our focus. 
Although John Lombardo finds the following cases problematic for their 
causal requirements,148 the “normative impairment” view explains them 
perfectly. In Municipality of Anchorage v. Flanagan, the defendant was 
deemed not to be entrapped because the crime of solicitation was complete at 
the time that a deal was struck to exchange money for sex.149 The deplorable 
fact that the undercover officer availed himself of the illicit sexual contact 
was beside the point—it didn’t cause the crime.150 And, in People v. Hillary, 
a paid confidential informant repeatedly requested drugs from the defendant 
who responded to her 976 date line advertisement.151 According to the 
defendant (whose request for an entrapment instruction was denied), after she 
offered him sex with both her and a friend, he agreed.152 However,153 when he 
went to meet the informant, he found her too unattractive to go forward with 
the sex.154 Still, having arranged to get her drugs, he proceeded to do so.155 
Because her conduct no longer was the proximate cause of his crime, there 
was no entrapment.156 
Notice what is happening in both of these cases. We are asking two 
questions: first, did the government engage in wrongful conduct, and second, 
did the wrongful conduct cause the crime? Although the purported rationale 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (2018); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (AM. LAW INST. 
2017).  
 147. John D. Lombardo, Causation and “Objective” Entrapment: Toward a Culpability-
Centered Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 209, 211–12 (1995) (under objective approach “the 
defendant is acquitted or convicted depending on whether the government employed an 
intolerable or an acceptable investigative stratagem”). 
 148. E.g., id. at 243 (objecting that “the courts’ added but-for causation element of the 
objective test sacrifices the test’s professed goal of deterring police misconduct in favor of 
avoiding its unsavory consequences, and in the process reinjects defendants’ predisposition into 
the entrapment analysis”). 
 149. Municipality of Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 150. Id. at 959–60; see also State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
no nexus between personal relationship and drug transaction). 
 151. People v. Hillary, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 417 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 152. Id. at 417. 
 153. Id. at 420.  
 154. See id. at 417. 
 155. Id. at 417. 
 156. Id. at 419 (“[W]e find that defendant submitted sufficient evidence to explain as a matter 
of entrapment his decision to obtain cocaine for Ms. Ross. Unfortunately, he went too far. 
Defendant testified that when he saw Ms. Ross, he no longer desired to have sex with her. By his 
own admission, his non-criminal motive evaporated.”). 
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for the objective test is to deter police misconduct,157 this justification leaves 
unexplained the causal requirement courts adopt.158 After all, we would better 
deter police misconduct if we did not limit entrapment just to those cases with 
a causal connection. Indeed, we punish attempts as well as completed 
offenses. There is, however, a perfectly clear rationale for causation—this is 
not about deterrence but about the state’s normative impairment; it is barred 
from benefitting from its wrongful behavior in procuring the crime.159 
2. Unclean Hands 
Unclean hands “prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his 
transgression.”160 For instance, the Restatement (3d) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment states: “Recovery in restitution to which an innocent 
claimant would be entitled may be limited or denied because of the claimant’s 
inequitable conduct in the transaction that is the source of the asserted 
liability.”161  The doctrine “spans every conceivable controversy.”162 
The doctrine of unclean hands is often justified as protecting the integrity 
of courts.163 Yet, as Ori Herstein has forcefully argued, the doctrine, as 
formulated, is ill-suited to this goal.164 Instead, Herstein claims that unclean 
hands may be about punishment.165 But again, this is truly a question of 
normative impairment, not punishment, as punishment would not require a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 157. Lombardo, supra note 147, at 214–15 (arguing that “the objective test withholds 
criminal convictions as a ‘stick’ to condemn certain government conduct, and parcels out criminal 
convictions in other cases as ‘carrots’ to applaud the official inducements employed, all the while 
ignoring the defendant’s personal accountability and using him as a pawn to manipulate executive 
branch behavior”); id. at 233–34 (noting state court decisions focused on the deterrence of police 
misconduct and analogizing to the exclusionary rule). 
 158. Id. at 236 (noting the deterrence rationale need not require causation). 
 159. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) 
(theorizing entrapment as “the refusal to lend the aid of the court’s own processes to the 
consummation of a wrong”). 
 160. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). 
 161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: EQUITABLE 
DISQUALIFICATION (UNCLEAN HANDS) § 63 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 162. T. Leigh Anenson, Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1827, 1829 (2018). 
 163. Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. 228, 247 (1848) (“The equitable powers of this court can never 
be exerted in behalf of one who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or any unfair means has 
gained an advantage. To aid a party in such a case would make this court the abettor of iniquity.”). 
 164. Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theory of the Clean Hands Defense, 17 LEGAL THEORY 
171, 191 (2011) (doubting the doctrine’s ability to “fully align” with the structural and 
instrumental concerns with court integrity). 
 165. Id. at 198 (defending unclean hands as a doctrine of retribution); see also id. at 194–95 
(also suggesting tu quoque as a justification for the defense). 
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causal relationship and the unclean hands doctrine does. As Leigh Anenson 
summarizes the cases, “[t]hese situations still can be loosely rationalized 
under the concept of preventing litigants from benefitting from their own 
wrong.”166 
The unclean hands doctrine requires a causal relation,167 though not one 
that is particularly well defined.168 As articulated in Mitchell Bros. Film 
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater,169 holding that the unclean hands doctrine 
was inapplicable where the defendant claimed the plaintiff could not recover 
for copyright infringement because the plaintiff’s movies were obscene: 
The maxim of unclean hands is not applied where plaintiff’s 
misconduct is not directly related to the merits of the controversy 
between the parties, but only where the wrongful acts ‘in some 
measure affect the equitable relations between the parties in respect 
of something brought before the court for adjudication. The alleged 
wrongdoing of the plaintiff does not bar relief unless the defendant 
can show that he has personally been injured by the plaintiff’s 
conduct. The doctrine of unclean hands ‘does not purport to search 
out or deal with the general moral attributes or standing of a 
litigant.’ Here it is clear that plaintiffs’ alleged wrongful conduct 
has not changed the equitable relationship between plaintiffs and 
defendants and has not injured the defendants in any way.170 
Here, too, we see that wrongdoing by one party prevents him from availing 
himself of rights that he might otherwise have. And, this wrongdoing must 
be connected to the wrongdoer’s claim. Mere wrongdoing “in the air” will 
not do. In this instance, the plaintiff’s potential wrong of creating obscene 
movies was unrelated to the defendant’s copyright violation.171 
In sum, these three disparate legal doctrines are of a piece. Law and 
morality are rightly concerned that individuals should not be able to act 
wrongfully and then keep the benefits of those wrongs. The state should not 
punish those it entraps. The plaintiff should not recover when her wrong 
contributes to her claim. And Ansari should not benefit from the consent he 
coerced. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 166. T. LEIGH ANENSON, JUDGING EQUITY: THE FUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS IN U.S. LAW 
(forthcoming Nov. 2018) (manuscript at 78) (on file with author). 
 167. See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (requiring 
“immediate and necessary relation” between wrongful act and the equity sought). See ANENSON, 
supra note 166 (manuscript at § 2.7.2) (setting forth the “connection component”). 
 168. ANENSON, supra note 166 (manuscript at 65) (“[I]t is sufficient if the dirty deed infects 
the issue before the court.”). 
 169. 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 170. Id. at 863 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 171. Id. at 854, 865. 
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3. Tightening the Causal Story 
Some might think that unclean hands’ causal requirement is over inclusive 
and entrapment’s causal requirement is under inclusive. That is, unclean 
hands does not seem to even articulate any clear causal condition, whereas 
entrapment requires proximate causation as seen in Hillary. The normative 
underpinnings of coercionW, as well as entrapment and unclean hands, 
suggest a Goldilocks solution. Specifically, any factual causation should 
count.172 
So long as what is done is wrongful, and that wrongdoing contributes to 
the consenter’s acquiescence, the defendant’s crime, and the unclean actor’s 
claim, should itself be sufficient to taint the claim. We can see that Hillary 
gets this wrong when we consider the facts. True, the defendant got the drugs 
even after deciding not to have sex with the informant.173 But that is not the 
question. The question is whether the state ought to be able to procure the 
commission of an offense through blatantly inappropriate conduct and then 
prosecute the fruits of that wrongdoing. The fact that the defendant acted 
voluntarily in the midst of it seems beside the point.174 Indeed, for coercionW’s 
normative impairment, we are assuming that B is voluntarily consenting. 
C. Berman’s Missteps 
Thus far I have argued that coercionW can be extended beyond the wrong 
of threatening to the wrong of availing oneself of the profits of one’s 
wrong.175 And, I have argued that this “normative impairment” exists in other 
areas of law. Now, I will demonstrate how the failure to see this implication 
distorted Berman’s own analysis. 
Because Berman’s objective was merely to substantiate that there were 
two distinct functions to coercion claims, he was insufficiently attentive to 
how normative powers, such as consent and promising, work. He clearly had 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 172. See Smith, supra note 2, at 354–55 (suggesting the application of broad cause in fact 
principles); see also infra note 240. 
 173. People v. Hillary, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 417 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 174. For doubts that voluntary actors break causal chains, see LARRY ALEXANDER & 
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, REFLECTIONS ON CRIME AND CULPABILITY: PROBLEMS AND 
PUZZLES 21–26 (2018). 
 175. One might object that the wrong is the act and it is the threat that is derivative. Yet in 
most cases where we say it is wrong to threaten what it will be wrong to do, we assume that B 
will be acting involuntarily. The cases under consideration are distinct in that the coercer is not 
simply completing an act that he induces at gunpoint, but completing an act where consent counts 
as “freely given.” We thus need an independent account of why it is wrong to avail oneself of 
another’s freely given consent. 
50:0951] CONSENT AND COERCION 989 
an inkling that promising might somehow be different, as he spent a section 
discussing why promising was not a case that required both coercionW and 
coercionE,176 but he missed the fact that his coercionW cases implicated the 
normative impairment that we have under consideration. Because of this 
blind spot, he fails to join issue with other theorists at times, and at others, he 
fails to correctly adjudicate the hypothetical at issue. The normative 
impairment implication I have defended better describes our moral landscape 
than does Berman’s thinner account. 
First, consider Berman’s dispute with Joel Feinberg. Here is Feinberg’s 
hypothetical and discussion: 
B is an extremely neurotic person who cannot bear to be patted on 
the back. A, who is larger and stronger than B, knowing of this 
peculiar sensitivity, demands that B sign over to him most of his 
worldly goods or else A will pat him on the back. Filled with 
genuine horror by A’s threat, B complies with the demand. . . . 
Given the account of voluntariness developed in these chapters, it 
would be an entirely intelligible result if the courts were to acquit A 
of the criminal charge, but find for the plaintiff B in his subsequent 
civil suit for full restitution.177 
In focusing on Feinberg’s claim that “B’s consent was voluntary enough 
to provide A with a defense to a criminal charge, since the coercive pressure 
was not coercive enough (by objective standards) for criminal liability,” 
Berman replies, “This strikes me as wrong.”178 To Berman, A has clearly 
committed coercionW. Berman deploys this example to show that even in the 
absence of coercionC, A has still done wrong. 
But the question is not whether A has engaged in any wrongdoing. Rather, 
Feinberg’s focus is not on patting people on the back; it is on taking their 
stuff by threat. Having failed to find coercionC, Feinberg finds no crime. What 
Berman should have realized is not just that patting someone on the back is 
wrong,179 but rather, that having threatened to do so, it is also wrong to take 
their worldly goods. We may not have a crime for that now, but maybe we 
should.180 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 176. Berman, supra note 1, at 67–73 (working through a series of hypotheticals to 
demonstrate that promises do not require both coercionC and coercionW). 
 177. FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 211–12. 
 178. Berman, supra note 1, at 75 (quoting FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 212). 
 179. See supra note 53 (discussion of thin-skulled victims). 
 180. To the extent that extortion does not have a success condition, this is arguably extortion. 
990 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
Feinberg is working on the implications of shifting coercionC 
formulations. That is a difficult question.181 But Berman’s response, to point 
to coercionW, fails to follow through as Berman only gets us so far as telling 
us it is wrong to threaten. But what we want to know is whether it is wrong 
to keep B’s worldly goods and we can reach the conclusion that it is, all 
within the framework of coercionW. Berman fails to see the further 
implications of a finding of coercionW. 
Whereas Berman criticizes Feinberg for requiring both coercionC and 
coercionW in order to condemn A’s action, he criticizes Jeffrie Murphy for 
what appears to be excusing B when all that exists is coercionW.182 Again, a 
more nuanced approach to the normative upshot of coercionW and to its effect 
on consent might have led Berman to a different answer. 
Specifically, Berman argues that Murphy overstates his claim that “[w]hen 
a person B consents to a proposal from A, and when his only or paramount 
reason for consenting to the proposal is his suffering wrongful treatment from 
A, then in such a case B has no moral obligation (even prima facie) generated 
from the act of consent.”183 In response, Berman begins with the following 
hypothetical: 
Imagine that A asks B, his neighbor and erstwhile friend, to pick up 
A’s child, C, after school one day. When B demurs, A recalls that 
he is still in possession of B’s lawn mower which he had borrowed 
some time ago: “Pick up C, please, or I won’t return your lawn 
mower.” “Okay,” says B, “I’ll get C.” Later, though, B decides that 
she doesn’t care about her lawn mower and consequently decides 
not to honor her promise to pick up C.184 
In assessing the case, Berman says, “It seems obvious that the mere fact 
that A threatened B with wrongful treatment would not morally excuse her 
for leaving C in the lurch.”185 “Pace Murphy, then, B’s act of consent did in 
fact generate a moral obligation. And that’s because the fact that her 
agreement was extracted in the face of coercionW does not itself entail that it 
was made under coercionE.”186 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 181. Feinberg’s claim about civil restitution is an interesting one and turns on his sliding 
scale for coercionC. It is because he has the view that the behavior counts as coercionC for civil 
cases that he does not answer what to do in its absence. I turn to the question of whether we should 
find subjective coercionC infra Section V.B.2. 
 182. Berman, supra note 1, at 78.  
 183. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy, supra note 45, at 81). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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Let’s clean up the analysis a bit. First, this is actually a promising case. 
What B does is to agree to pick up C. Second, as I have argued above, the 
question is not whether B’s nonperformance can be excused but rather 
whether B has promised A anything at all.187 Third, note that to Berman, B is 
not coercedC because that question is moralized and he believes that because 
of the harm to C, B cannot count as being coercedC.188 
It is useful to approach this by assuming that B promised A to pick A up. 
Imagine that B fails to show, and A claims that B broke his promise. Here, it 
seems plain that B may claim, “You threatened me. There was no effective 
promise for you!” Similarly, if C’s school fines A $100 for A’s late pick up 
(after B fails to show), it seems hard to believe that any court of law would 
give A a dime. 
Of course, if we imagine that B’s promise was to watch C at the pool, and 
then B walked away, most people will likely say B has done the wrong thing. 
So, the question is, what explains this intuition? Notice that what B does is to 
essentially become an (innocent) cause of C’s peril. C is not picked up, or C 
is not watched at the pool, because A relies on B. And even if A has no moral 
claim against B, C clearly has a claim that B not create situations in which C 
will be placed in peril. Indeed, to see this, consider that even if A held a gun 
to B’s head and said, “Watch my kid at the pool now or I will kill you. I am 
off to get a margarita,” it seems that B’s nodding that she will do so does 
create some obligation not to let C drown. Hence, this situation is best 
explained by the expansiveness of duty to rescue rules when one is a cause 
(even an innocent cause),189 and not B owing a duty to A.190 
Hence, because Berman failed to see that the normative upshot of A’s 
wrongdoing is his inability to avail himself of the fruits of that wrongdoing, 
Berman was unable to properly adjudicate cases that dealt with consent and 
promising. With the more nuanced approach suggested here, Berman would 
be able to come to more subtle and convincing conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
 188. Berman, supra note 1, at 78. Berman thinks that although coercionW and coercionC are 
not both necessary, coercionC does require a “constraining choice predicament” and a “substantive 
moral evaluation.” Id. at 68. Accordingly, the third-party harm to C affects whether B ought to be 
excused. Id. Another route to this conclusion is that we can deny that B is coercedC given the 
potentially legally adequate alternatives. See infra text accompanying notes 203–05. 
 189. Cf. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 995 P.2d 951, 958 
(Mont. 2000) (finding duty to rescue where defendant was creator of peril because she acted in 
self-defense but then did not call 911). 
 190. Larry Alexander, Duties to Act Triggered by Creation of the Peril: Easy Cases, Puzzling 
Cases, and Complex Culpability, in THE ETHICS AND LAW OF OMISSIONS 180, 182–85 (Dana Kay 
Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless eds., 2017). 
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IV. CRIMINALIZATION CONSIDERED 
To this point, I have argued that coercionC and coercionW have 
independent functions, and that one of the most notable features of coercionW 
is that it results in normative impairment. That is, the actor cannot avail 
himself of the consent even if it counts as sufficiently freely given. In that the 
behavior is wrong, we ought to then ask whether it should be a crime. This 
section sketches out such an offense. It then turns to countervailing concerns 
including paternalism and the potential to undermine progress towards 
affirmative, communicated consent. It tentatively concludes that 
criminalization is inappropriate, but that conversations about the 
wrongfulness of the behavior should continue. 
A. Codifying the Crime 
Although for reasons discussed infra, we should be cautious about 
enacting a crime to cover this wrongdoing, for discussion purposes, it is worth 
setting forth what this sort of crime could look like. 
Accordingly, we might criminalize sex by threat as follows: 
 
Sex by Threat191 
 
A person is guilty of sex by threat if the actor recklessly causes another 
person to engage in sexual intercourse by using words or conduct that cause 
that other person to believe that the actor will breach a legal or moral duty 
the actor owes to that other person if that person does not comply with the 
actor’s request for sex. For purposes of this statute, it is irrelevant that the 
other person consented to the sexual intercourse. 
 
Even this formulation is under inclusive in two important respects. First, 
sex is certainly not the only thing that a wrongdoer can obtain in this way. 
But, just as we separate property offenses from sexual offenses, we can focus 
on sex by threat, an offense that might then apply more broadly. Second, the 
sort of wrongdoing from which one may not profit clearly extends beyond 
coercion. Coercive proposals are but some subset of wrongful proposals.192 
Still, this allows us to articulate a core case of normative impairment resulting 
from coercionW and interrogate its implications. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 191. I thank Rachel Harmon for suggesting that what I was gesturing toward was this offense. 
 192. Berman, supra note 1, at 52 (clarifying that coerciveW proposals are not the name for 
wrongful proposals, but a subset of them). 
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There are several features of this formulation worth noting. First, it 
eschews the amorphous term, “threat,” within the actual offense definition. 
Threats can be either inchoate abilities to harm (I am a threat to you if I am 
hiding in your closet with a knife) or fear causings (I threaten you if I scare 
you by showing you a knife).193 Second, abiding by the Model Penal Code’s 
default mens rea, it relies on recklessness.194 This resolves unanswered 
questions from Elonis as to how to conceptualize the mental state for 
threats,195 and it avoids questions about sincerity.196 It does not matter whether 
the defendant really was going to breach the duty, just that he consciously 
disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was creating that 
belief, and it was that belief creation that caused the consent. Third, for 
purposes of this offense, the “victim’s” consent is beside the point as this is 
not a coercionC case. 
This statute is not intended as the final word. Rather, it aims to be the first 
word in the conversation. If we are going to think about criminalization, here 
is what it might look like. 
B. Is the Failure to Require CoercionC for Normative Impairment 
Paternalistic? 
There is a question here about whether this crime is paternalistic. The 
reason is as follows: this punishes coercionW without coercionC. There is little 
question that coercionW with coercionC is sufficient for criminalization. 
Whenever we dictate the proper boundaries of sexual interactions, we 
should be attentive to whether we unconsciously adopt the very hierarchy we 
are aiming to avoid.197 Are we being paternalistic toward women when we 
render sex wrongful even when it is a product of their free will, simply 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 193. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Bluff: The Power of Insincere Actions, 23 LEGAL THEORY 
168, 193–194 (2017) (distinguishing these types). 
 194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
 195. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–13 (2015) (holding that threats require a 
mental state but declining to resolve if recklessness suffices). 
 196. One pair of scholars recently argued that the critical question is whether the threat is 
credible, and maintained that credible threats should be enforced. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra 
note 1, at 721 (“The single decisive factor in determining whether remedies should be granted is 
whether the threat was credible—was the threatening party ready and willing to carry out the 
threat in the event that the threatened party did not acquiesce, or was he merely bluffing?”). If the 
robber really means “your money or your life,” he should be punished, but he should get to keep 
your money!  
 197. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (arguing that 
battered women syndrome reinforces gender hierarchical views). 
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because they have been badgered by a cad?198 There are two objections 
lurking here, one of which should cause us more hesitation than the other. 
Let’s start with the easy case. 
Recognizing that coercionW can render sex wrongful does not infantilize 
women. Deeming one person to act wrongfully says nothing about the agency 
of the other. Let me illustrate this by turning to a different instance in which 
one person may be subject to incessant, wrongful whining by another: 
parenting. 
Parenting a teenager is an exercise in being subjected to cajoling, 
wheedling, emotional blackmail, sulking, and being told you are hated and 
“the worst,” with no option to exit and no end in sight. The requests, be they 
clothes, the latest iPhones, videogames, or ice cream, are plentiful, constant, 
and trivial. But good parents don’t give in to their children’s whims. Good 
parents stand their ground. 
However, as even a good parent will tell you, sometimes the pressure gets 
to be too much and you say “yes” when you should say “no.” 
You . . . just . . . want . . . it . . . to . . . stop. And so, against your better 
judgment, you have suddenly said yes to an afterschool trip to Dairy Queen. 
Let’s be clear. This is coercionW without coercionC. And, that means you 
are responsible. When your partner comes home and asks why you allowed 
this, you can be called to account for it. Your reasoning—I couldn’t take it 
anymore—often neither justifies nor excuses your weak will. If you are the 
mommy, the buck stops with you. 
That said, your child still acts wrongfully. At the very least, as he wipes 
the ice cream off his chin, he ought to apologize. And, at the most, he ought 
to get up to the counter and before he orders, think the better of it. But there 
is no doubt that he owes you an apology because of his wrongful procurement 
of that dripping cone. Your agency is neither undermined nor undone by the 
recognition that he coercedW you. Blaming him is not undermining you. 
Here is a deeper worry. Maybe some people want to have sex with cads 
and shrews. If your partner behaves wrongfully and procures your consent, 
why should her wrongful behavior restrict your freedom? If you choose sex 
with sufficient freedom that coercionC does not exist, then why should the act 
be forbidden? 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 198. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 249 (“Is the prevention of exploitation as such an 
independent ground for criminal prohibitions? An affirmative answer would endorse either legal 
paternalism or a form of legal moralism.”). 
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In the context of contracts, we have an answer for this. Contracts made 
under duress are voidable, not void.199 That means that in instances of both 
coercionC and coercionW, the coercee has the power to allow the contract to 
stand—to remove the taint. Indeed, even consent procured at gunpoint may 
be treated as valid consent by the consenter. Here, we might imagine that 
Grace finds Ansari’s incessant badgering attractive. Or, perhaps Warren 
Buffett is held up at gunpoint, but he does not give the money over because 
he fears death (perhaps he has been diagnosed with a terrible disease and 
would welcome the quick end) but because he admires the young lad’s 
spunk.200 
On the one hand, punishment seems troubling. Can’t Buffett dispose of 
his money as he sees fit? And, can’t Grace opt to find jerks attractive? On the 
other hand, why should Ansari and the would-be robber be off the hook? 
Should the robber get to keep the money? They both engage in wrongdoing 
by threatening someone, and it is that wrongdoing that results in them 
receiving the goal of their threats. Why wouldn’t they be normatively 
impaired? 
These disparate intuitions stem from two distinct concerns fighting each 
other: the interests of the victim and the wrongdoing of the perpetrator. The 
victim has interest in removing the moral taint.201 It seems odd to think that 
we would not be able to remove the moral taint, when the reason why an 
action was wrong in the first place is because we are the victims. Of course, 
the other side of the equation is that the coercer is a wrongdoer. Victims do 
not usually get to remove the taint if the defendant shoots at them but then 
apologizes. Still, these cases may be different in that consent-sensitive crimes 
are particularly focused on the victim’s autonomy. To give the victim no 
choice in how she wishes to treat the threat undermines the very interest we 
are trying to protect. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“If a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim 
no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”); see also Stewart, supra note 
2, at 185 (“If [A’s] coercion of [B] ceases, so that [B’s] autonomy is restored, there is no reason 
why [B] cannot effectively exercise his or her autonomy to affirm the agreement.”). Shotgun 
weddings are also voidable. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 72 (“A marriage produced by the 
threat of violence has always been voidable in most American courts.”). 
 200. I thank Michael Livermore and Pierre Verdier for raising these hypothetical cases. 
 201. How could this be understood with respect to sex? Just as the “no means no” rule invites 
the question of when it is permissible to “try again,” we would need to work out the boundaries 
for when consent would be permissible. And, just as with “no means no,” the easiest cases will 
be those in which the consenter is the one who re-engages. I won’t pretend that this is not also a 
difficult question. But again, we can’t find the answers until we know what the right questions 
are. 
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There may be questions then about whether we should criminally (or 
otherwise) prohibit behavior, even if it is immoral, when the primary “victim” 
of the wrong is no victim at all.202 That is, if Albert forces Bob to mow his 
lawn at gunpoint, we have coercionW with coercionC and that behavior is 
within the ambit of the criminal law. But when the lesser threat does not rise 
to the level of coercionC then if we punish Albert, we may prohibit Bob from 
doing what he chooses to do, because we want to tell Albert not to act. Hence, 
although Albert’s conduct may be wrongful, before we let the law intervene, 
we might ask whether it should be given that the very “victim” of the 
wrongful threat chooses to allow it. This is not to say that all instances in 
which coercionC is absent are instances that ought not to be prohibited, but it 
is to say that without coercionC, the law may wish to take into account the 
interest of the would-be victim in allowing the conduct to occur. If my child 
is annoying and bratty for asking for ice cream, I, as the victim, may still wish 
to be able to give it to him. A law that prevents him from receiving the cone, 
inhibits my freedom to give it to him. Any criminalization question, then, 
must take into account the effect on not just the wrongdoer but the willing 
“victim.” 
Notably, outside of the criminal law, the fact that the “victim” is no victim 
at all becomes a powerful objection. It is one thing to say that someone did 
something morally wrong or to use a legal process to punish someone for 
their wrongdoing, but it is another question whether we should allow the 
“victim” who was not coercedC to avail himself of a legal remedy. 
For example, assume I am giving a lecture and the dean at the relevant 
school, Mike, really wants my Monet painting, and he says, “I am going to 
cancel your hotel reservation for tonight (that the school is paying for) unless 
you give me your Monet.” And assume (1) I have a credit card, and (2) there 
are plenty of hotel rooms available. The law might rightly say that my 
appropriate course of action is to pay for my hotel and then sue to recover the 
$150, not to hand over something far more valuable.203 When threats do not 
rise to the level of being coercionC, the law might rightly say that it, too, can 
expect a person to have a certain amount of resilience. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 202. This arguably falls into Feinberg’s category of “welfare-connected non-grievance 
evils.” JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 32 (1988) (“The evil is not the basis of anyone’s 
legitimate personal grievance, but it is not an evil that is unassociated with human interests and 
well-being. A criminal statute designed to prevent such evils would be a departure from strict 
liberal legitimizing standards, but it would not be contrary to the animating humane spirit of the 
liberal’s harm principle.”). 
 203. Stewart, supra note 2, at 185 (arguing that contract law should not give a duress defense 
if B had reasonable alternatives). 
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For further illustration, consider a variation on the oft-discussed 
hypothetical from Richard Epstein.204 You’ve paid the drycleaner at drop-off 
$10 each for two shirts. At pickup, the drycleaner demands another $20. You 
give him a check, though you have plenty of other shirts. 
Now, we can imagine a few different reactions here: (1) if he cashes the 
check, you can sue him; (2) he could not complain if you stop payment on 
the check; (3) you may not sue him to recover the $20 but he ought not cash 
the check and he commits a crime by keeping the money. 
It is clear that 2 and 3 are true. The payment is morally tainted. This shows 
us that even if you had an adequate legal remedy and thus cannot claim you 
acted with coercionC, the receipt of the cash is still morally tainted. We may 
nevertheless have a separate question of whether courts will step in to give 
you your money back given the adequacy of the remedy in the first instance. 
This may mean that nothing short of coercionW plus coercionC should be 
sufficient for replevin and perhaps rescission, not because we do not think 
the transaction is morally tainted, but because we do not think the law should 
be employed to help those who had the opportunity to help themselves. As 
Alan Wertheimer says, “Our legal system is designed to provide remedies for 
(some) private wrongs. If one decides to forgo what is an adequate remedy, 
it is arguable that society has done all it needs to do.”205 
Ultimately, then, even if a lesser formulation than coercionW plus 
coercionC is sufficient to normatively impair the coercer, there may be 
reasons extrinsic to her wrongdoing for why this lesser formulation may seem 
problematic. Specifically, perhaps we want individuals to have the ability to 
remove the moral taint and hence do not want their conduct to be prohibited 
as a result of their partner’s wrongdoing or perhaps the law does not want to 
provide a remedy for those who could have helped themselves. The former 
concern, in particular, may raise questions about whether criminalization is 
appropriate. 
C. Could This Crime Be Counterproductive? 
Not every wrongful behavior is criminalized. Not even every instance of 
coercion is criminalized. Moreover, coercionW without coercionC is, in some 
sense, a victimless crime, as the victim has consented. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 204. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 
296 (1975); see also Berman, supra note 1, at 69–73 (varying the hypothetical). 
 205. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 35. I thank John Harrison for pressing me on this 
question. 
998 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
Should we have the crime of Sex by Threat? I will confess to being rather 
ambivalent about this question. Certainly, I see the behavior as blameworthy 
and the defendant as deserving of some punishment. But I take seriously that 
there ought to be constraints on criminalization,206 though sexual offenses 
have been radically undercriminalized, not overcriminalized.207 
One further consideration against criminalization warrants mentioning.208 
At the moment, we are still debating what constitutes consent. And, 
irrespective of whether one takes affirmative consent to be necessary for 
permissible sex, one might still think it is an ideal we ought to aspire to.209 
Views like Michelle Anderson’s, that take sex to be about communication 
and negotiation are important, even if sometimes too aspirational for the 
criminal law.210 However, if after we start encouraging people to talk, and 
specifically encouraging them to negotiate, and the criminal law then 
punishes some negotiations as over the line, we could chill the very speech 
we aim to promote. True, there are clear cases. But there will be plenty that 
are not. And, so, even if we think some of this conduct is wrongful, we may 
risk disincentivizing the very discourse feminists have been aiming to create. 
Surely, this objection is not decisive, but it is an important objection. 
Again, my ambition is to start the debate, not resolve it. And so, if we 
recognize that some coerced sex is a lesser wrong, we can then ask whether 
it is a wrong that warrants punitive sanctions. 
In summary, although there are reasons to condemn Ansari’s conduct, we 
may need to tread wisely. We risk criminalizing behavior the victim 
condones, and we risk chilling the very speech we aim to promote. Along 
with these concerns, we must take seriously the inherent inequities of the 
criminal justice system.211 Although those inequities are not best dealt with 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 206. For the most thorough discussion to date, see generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009). 
 207. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 336–38 (2017) 
(discussing current state of American rape law as well as discussing reform efforts). 
 208. I am indebted to Josh Bowers for raising this thought-provoking objection. 
 209. Cf. Ferzan, supra note 73, at 437–38 (discussing how colleges could approach 
affirmative consent but offering cautions). 
 210. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2005) 
(advocating that individuals verbally communicate before intercourse). 
 211. See Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 351. Schulhofer characterizes the competing sides of 
rape reform as: 
There is pervasive under-reporting and under-enforcement, pervasive 
unwillingness to credit well-founded victim complaints, and pervasive 
inadequacy of punishment in prosecutions that lead to conviction. All that is 
true. Those problems exist to an alarming degree. But victim advocates must 
be equally willing to acknowledge the opposing dynamic that exists side-by-
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by failing to punish behaviors that are clearly criminal, they do counsel for 
caution in more borderline cases. 
V. OBJECTIONS 
To this point, we have seen that there are two functions of coercion claims, 
and that normative impairment follows from coercionW. I have also addressed 
the legal implications for normative impairment. With respect to this, I have 
suggested a draft statute for discussion purposes but also raised concerns that 
criminalization could be paternalistic or counterproductive. 
We have jumped through many hoops, and thus, we should confront the 
objection that perhaps things are not so messy. Perhaps a better understanding 
of coercion could eliminate these two distinct normative functions—at least 
insofar as consent is concerned. 
This Part considers two “field occupancy” claims. One of which grabs all 
the territory for coercionW, thereby eliminating coercionC, and the other of 
which takes a nuanced view of coercionC that would then eliminate the need 
to look to coercionW. I conclude that neither type of account can explain all 
the features of consent and coercion, and thus both types of coercion are 
necessary for a full understanding of the normative landscape. 
A. The Claim that CoercionW Is Sufficient 
Few theorists focus exclusively on coercionW when it comes to questions 
of consent. In a rare exemplar of this sort of approach, Arudra Burra claims 
that coercionC is beside the point.212 Focusing on deception (but noting his 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
side with that neglect: pervasive race bias and class bias in enforcement; 
pervasive abuse of charging power and plea bargaining; pervasive rigidity and 
disproportionality in punishment; pervasive overbreadth, overreaction, and 
inflexibility in the deployment of collateral consequences such as registration, 
community notification, and restrictions on public benefits, employment, and 
residency. 
Id. 
 212. Burra, supra note 33, at 3. 
I suggest an alternative picture of the role played by the absence of consent in 
explanations of why certain acts are impermissible. This role is mediated by 
the value or importance of having control over certain aspects of our lives in 
certain circumstances, a control which we can exercise by signaling our 
desires, wishes, and preferences, and having these signals respected. Under 
certain conditions, expressing and withholding consent are ways in which we 
can communicate this information. The wrongfulness of doing something 
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view’s equal applicability to coercion), Burra claims that what is important 
in “nonconsensual” cases is that the deceptions “constitute domain-specific 
violations of duties involving getting other people to do things.”213 
Burra considers a case in which one buys a forged painting from an art 
dealer.214 Burra argues that when one is deceived, one may have acted 
culpably, negligently, or innocently in what happens to one, and so too the 
“deceiver” may be culpable, negligent, or innocent.215 “The relevant question 
in every case is: who should be saddled with the fake [painting], and at what 
price? To answer this question we consider various issues” and to Burra these 
boil down to the duties the seller owes the buyer.216 Burra thinks that you do 
not need consent to explain why the sale is invalid when it is.217 Burra takes 
the question to be the duties, and if you breach the duty, you should not profit 
from your own wrong, and hence, ought to return the money.218 
Although there is certainly much to like about Burra’s approach, he takes 
things a step too far when he eliminates consent from the picture. First 
consider third party cases. Rebecca Burnham was forced by her husband to 
work as a prostitute.219 Assume the man who has sex with her is unaware of 
any of those facts and that Burnham intentionally kept him unaware. Here, it 
seems that Burnham was sexually assaulted, but the man behaved 
nonculpably because he was unaware of coercion by the husband. That is, 
when coercionC is present, it taints the transaction, as it undermines the 
voluntariness of the underlying consent. 
Burra recognizes that Burnham-type cases are a counterexample.220 He 
believes he has an argument around the problem.221 Burra claims that if you 
are the innocent transmitter of poison (from A to B) then you have done 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
without another’s consent will then depend (amongst other things) upon why 
control of this sort was morally important to being with. This importance, in 
turn, is contingent and variable: in particular, it might depend upon quite fine-
grained empirical analysis.  
Id. 
 213. Id. at 5. 
 214. Id. at 14. 
 215. Id. at 15–16. 
 216. Id. at 18. 
 217. Id. at 20. 
 218. Id. at 19. 
 219. WESTEN, supra note 35, at 139–60 (discussing People v. Burnham, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 
639 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
 220. Burra, supra note 33, at 25 (noting this is “a difficult case to think about”). 
 221. Id. at 25–26. 
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nothing wrong; you are just a tool in someone else’s plan.222 Burnham’s 
clients are likewise innocent tools. 
This approach is misguided. If you take it as possible to wrong someone 
without culpability—as would happen if you accidentally ran over your 
neighbor’s child when he darted in front of your car to get a ball—then 
innocent actors can behave wrongfully. The fact that there is another actor, 
causally upstream of you, does not relieve your responsibility. Indeed, if 
instead of being an innocent transmitter of poison, you were negligent, it 
would be clear that you would be liable, despite being a ‘tool in someone 
else’s plan.’223 
Second, consider the further implication that abandoning coercionC leaves 
duress entirely unexplained. It takes the facts about B completely out of the 
picture, but the criminal defense would certainly require a focus on B. 
Admittedly, there are distinctions to be drawn between undermining the 
voluntariness of a criminal act—and thus seeking an excuse—and 
undermining the voluntariness of consenting—and thus arguing that one’s 
consent is ineffective. Nevertheless, the idea that when a gun is pointed at 
you, the reason why your consent is ineffective is completely unrelated to 
why you are not criminal liable seems strange. After all, in both instances, 
the voluntariness of your choice is being assessed.224 
Ultimately, Burra’s myopic approach fails to give us the resources to 
recognize that choices can be tainted by the involuntariness of the chooser. 
This involuntariness may undermine criminal liability. But it may also 
undermine the normative force of the consent or promise.225 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 222. Id. at 26. 
 223. See id. This is akin to the conceptual error that students make in criminal law. After I 
teach them that voluntary actors break the causal chain and that per Hart and Honoré 
involuntariness in this case is broad (including not just no act, but no mens rea, as well as 
justifications and excuses), students will sometimes seek to run the involuntariness test on the 
actor and determine he is not a cause. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 
76 (2d ed. 1985). If A points a gun at B and tells him to give C the poison, A is responsible 
because B does not break the causal chain because of duress. But when analyzing B it is a mistake 
to think that B is not a cause “as a tool in A’s plan.” Rather, one looks at causation from B to C, 
and finds no third parties who break the chain. B is a cause; he just acted under duress. (To be 
perfectly accurate in this hypothetical, one would run the voluntariness of C’s taking the poison 
in assessing B’s responsibility. Because C is ignorant of the poison, B is the cause.) 
 224. Hurd, supra note 71, at 140. 
 225. In defending that the explanation for coercion lies completely with the coercer, Hallie 
Liberto imagines two cases. In the first, A threatens to kill B and C unless they have sex with each 
other. B and C then agree to do so. In the second, A threatens to kill B and C unless they have sex 
with each other. B then forces herself on C despite C’s protests. Given A’s coercion, a 
voluntariness approach appears to be unable to distinguish between these cases. See Hallie 
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B. Rethinking CoercionC 
We will now take a look at the other side of the equation. First, I will 
consider Tom Dougherty’s proposal that there are degrees of consent. 
Second, I will consider whether a more subjective formulation of coercionC 
would resolve these questions. 
1. Dougherty and Degrees of Consent 
Tom Dougherty argues that there are degrees of consent.226 The strength 
of our duties depends on whether the consent is valid, invalid, or flawed. He 
thus contrasts the Severe Case in which Leila threatens to get Jem fired unless 
Jem invites Leila to her party, 227 with the Mild Case where Leila procures an 
invitation to Jem’s party by guilt tripping her.228 Jem sees Leila as “an 
unwanted nuisance. Seeking an easier life, Jem caves in and invites Leila.”229 
Both cases stand in contrast to the Benign Case wherein Leila does her best 
to hide that her feelings are hurt because she was not invited, and Jem, 
realizing she has upset Leila, then invites her.230 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Liberto, Coercion, Consent, and Moral Debilitation 16–18 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 This is a difficult puzzle. As noted by Millum, sometimes it can be all things considered 
permissible to act even when the coercee is acting involuntarily. Millum, supra note 6, at 115–
20. The issue of whether the clients will all-things-considered wrong her depends upon the 
alternatives. Id. at 120–25. That is, in some cases, the coerced party may be better off if the third 
party engages in the act. In the Burnham case that is hard to believe, as the third parties have the 
option of paying her but not receiving sex, but in some cases, Millum has shown that the best 
result in the bad situation may be to engage in the act. Id. Notice then that the justification does 
not come from the fact that the person won’t be wronged—the victim still does not consent. 
Instead, the unconsented-to act is still better than not engaging in the unconsented-to act. 
 Millum’s example is helpful to illustrate this. Id. at 119–20. Assume that Alice threatens to 
break Betty’s legs unless Betty sells her bicycle for $100 and gives the money to Alice. Carl has 
just arrived in town and needs a bike to commute to work. Moreover, Carl does not have a lot of 
money so he needs to use his money to buy a bike. Although Betty is best off if Carl gives her 
money, this is not something she can fairly ask of Carl. At the same time, if Carl walks away and 
gets the bike from someone else, Betty is actually worse off than if she transacts with Carl. 
Accordingly, of the three options (no sale, sale, and gift), sale is actually the one that is best for 
Betty and Carl jointly. In such a case, then, the third party may act, even though the permissibility 
of his action does not derive from the victim’s consent. Instead, the action is permissible in spite 
of the lack of consent. Id. at 120. 
 226. Dougherty, supra note 139, at 2 (arguing that consent can also be partially valid). 
 227. Id. at 7–8. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 8.  
 230. Id. at 6. 
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With respect to the Severe and Mild cases, Dougherty says Leila should 
not attend.231 And with respect to the Severe Case, Dougherty says that “Leila 
would need a much stronger reason to justify turning up at the party.”232 
Dougherty’s puzzle is if the Benign Case and the Mild Case both “count” as 
consensual “then we have not articulated a difference between the Mild Case 
and the Benign Case.”233 Dougherty’s answer is that different degrees of 
coercion correlate with different degrees of consent.234 When consent is 
invalid, the consenter is wronged, and when the consent is “flawed,” then the 
coercer breaches a duty of lesser stringency.235 Essentially, this is akin to 
saying that the very same act can be very wrong or only slightly wrong, 
depending on the quality of consent. 
Dougherty and I reach the same conclusions but have different 
explanations. We agree that Leila may attend the party in the Benign Case 
and that it would be worse for Leila to attend the party in the Severe Case 
than in the Mild Case. Dougherty believes this shows a scalarity of consent. 
I believe that the Mild Case is a case of coercionW with normative 
impairment, whereas the Severe Case implicates coercionC. 
The question is how to adjudicate which view is correct. There will be the 
consistent intuition that the consent is flawed in the case of nagging and 
haranguing, and moreover, a sense that it is morally problematic for the 
coercer to avail herself of the benefit. How do we determine whether it is the 
coercionC that is doing the normative heavy lifting or the coercionW? 
A crucial distinction between these explanations lies at the heart of the 
impairment. If the case entails coercionC, then the output, or the consent, is 
tainted. If C sees A rob B and take B’s necklace, it is impermissible for C to 
take the necklace. She knows that B did not give the necklace willingly, and 
that the possession is tainted. In contrast, coercionW cases are not instances 
of “involuntary” consent by B. Rather, they are cases in which there is 
something about A that prohibits A’s availment of the consent. A is rendered 
morally powerless by his wrongdoing. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 231. Id. at 10–11. 
 232. Id. at 7. 
 233. Id. at 8. 
 234. Dougherty’s view thus allows that the degree of sexual wrongdoing can depend on the 
type of threat. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 36, at 132: 
Sexual coercion is simply any conduct that threatens to violate the victim’s 
rights. Conduct that forces a person to choose between her sexual autonomy 
and any of her other legally protected entitlements—rights to property, to 
privacy, and to reputation—is by definition improper; it deserves to be treated 
as a serious criminal offense. 
 235. Dougherty, supra note 139, at 15. 
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If Dougherty is right, then all the cases in which we are dealing will be 
cases in which C is prevented from benefitting if she knows of A’s 
wrongdoing, because the flaw is with the consent, not with the consentee.236 
To test our considered judgments, we might ask then whether my child’s 
friend who is in the car ought not to have an ice cream if she knows it is 
because my child whined. Or whether the passenger’s wife ought not to use 
your pen. Or whether Leila’s friend ought not to go to the party if Leila 
procured the invite for her by whining. Indeed, given that having a culpable 
mental state is not necessary for wrongdoing,237 then the question is whether 
the friend may eat the ice cream even though my child whined the night 
before, or the passenger’s wife may use the pen if she was in the restroom 
when it was procured, or whether Leila’s friend may go to the party when she 
doesn’t know what Leila did. Are the agreements in these cases tainted such 
that third parties are dealing with “damaged goods?” Or is it simply that the 
wrongdoer should not benefit? After all, this much is clear, when coercionC 
is at work, it does bar the behavior. Burnham’s client should not be having 
sex with her. 
At some point, philosophical arguments will bottom out in different 
intuitions about these cases. If the underlying consent does not appear tainted, 
then the problem is with the coercer, and not the voluntariness of the consent 
obtained. Dougherty’s explanation fails. 
Along these lines, we may wish to return to our entrapment analogy. There 
are certainly cases where entrapment applies but third parties would have 
standing to complain. If the government offers Angela $100,000 to punch 
Becca in the face, we might think the government now lacks standing to 
prosecute the assault, but that Becca may still sue Angela for damages. 
Dougherty’s approach leaves these cases unexplained. 
A final problem is that Dougherty’s abandonment of binary relations may 
wreak havoc on other legal relations. Recall that Dougherty thinks duties can 
be more or less stringent, depending on the coercion.238 But what is it to 
“kinda promise” or “sort of abandon?” 
In conclusion, an approach that takes into account degrees of voluntariness 
cannot explain why third parties may avail themselves of “flawed consent.” 
It also sits uncomfortably with how promising and abandonment work. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 236. Dougherty concurs with this methodological maneuver, or as he calls it, “neat trick.” Id. 
at 16. 
 237. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 295 (1991) 
(suggesting the “Irrelevance-of-Fault-to-Permissibility Thesis”). 
 238. Dougherty, supra note 139, at 6. 
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2. Subjectivizing CoercionC 
Even if one disputes Dougherty’s notion that there are degrees of consent, 
one might still think that this project is misguided because it fails to formulate 
coercionC correctly and that a different formulation of what counts as 
undermining choice does all the normative heavy lifting. Maybe the prior 
formulation for coercionC should not require “a person of reasonable 
firmness.” Maybe all that coercionC should require is subjective coercionC. If 
a man would prefer to hand over all of his earthly belongings than to be beaten 
with a wet noodle, why should it matter that that is not how the person of 
reasonable firmness would order her preferences? Or, to take this away from 
the absurd, why if a woman truly ranks some harm as worse than surrendering 
sex do we not deem it rape? Particularly with respect to sex, it seems that the 
unwanted nature of contact is the violation, not how that coercion relates to 
reasonability. 
This issue raises the question of what constitutes coercionC. As we have 
seen, the criminal law has traditionally required a person of reasonable 
firmness. But perhaps this is misguided. That would mean that when we think 
about the sort of coercion that undermines choice (the duress-like coercion), 
we have inappropriately inserted objective criteria.239 
There is a clear and intuitive pull to defining coercionC subjectively. We 
may then need to figure out, as we do with other wholly subjective tests, how 
to define its boundaries—what constitutes too much pressure? And, we might 
need to ask about grading—If I am the sort who surrenders Monets for hotel 
rooms or a man feels far more protective of his goldfish than whether he will 
have sex with his girlfriend, then should we view the harms as we objectively 
do (as grand theft and rape) or should we take into account the victim’s 
preferences and reduce the gravity as the victims do?240 And, how should law 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 239. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 211: 
Restricting our attention, however, to wholly self-regarding situations, and the 
problem of protecting B’s choice about matters that directly concern only her 
own interest, I find no reason to apply any price tags to B’s options but those 
that B applies herself. If B accedes to A’s unwelcome proposal only because 
the cost she attaches to A’s threatened harm is even greater than the large cost 
of A’s demand itself, then her consent has been coerced no matter how 
eccentric her judgment of comparative evil may be, even if those judgments 
are unreasonable or perverse. 
 240. See Ferzan & Westen, supra note 10, at 778 (articulating this worry). Larry Alexander’s 
formulation of coercionC is moralized. The question is whether one is forgoing one’s moral 
objection; his view also leads to trivial coercions yielding nonconsensual interactions: 
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react when I ask to have my Monet returned?241 In private law, taking 
coercionC as subjective will require courts to undo the choices that 
unreasonable people make. 
At the theoretical level, however, we need not accept or worry about the 
law’s rigid categories. And, at the theoretical level, we may wish to give 
coercionC more ground. However, for my argument to fail, it must be the case 
that there are no instances that would fall within coercionW but not coercionC. 
Here are three reasons to think that coercionW without coercionC is not an 
empty set, even with a more expansive notion of coercionC. First, some sorts 
of conduct are very low level instances of coercion. This is what is 
exemplified in the Aziz Ansari case, in which the coercion is whining. There 
is a live debate over whether this sort of behavior undermines consent. 
Second, in some coercion situations, the coercion creates causal 
complications. That is, the coercion may be neither necessary nor sufficient 
to cause the consent, yet still play a causal role.242 When there are complicated 
“causal cocktails,” we may be reticent to view the resulting consent as 
involuntary. Finally, the concern with “reasonable alternatives” appears.243 
Even when coercion causes the behavior, we may worry about whether actors 
count as coerced if I could pay for the hotel room, rather than surrender my 
Monet, or whether you should take the dry cleaner to small claims court, or 
whether Grace ought to have just left. A more robust coercionC might fail to 
condemn conduct when one or more of these reasons applies. 
Hence, instead of fighting over whether “Grace could leave” does 
undermine consent, our gaze is better focused on Ansari’s conduct and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Finally, the account of consent I have offered leads to the result that a threat 
to engage in a trivial boundary crossing—say, a threat of a pinch—can make 
acquiescence in sex nonconsensual if it, in fact, induces the acquiescence. That 
is not an embarrassing result for me. I want to say, rather, that although the sex 
is nonconsensual, the violation of rights that it represents is trivial. Obviously, 
if someone would rather submit to sex than to a pinch, she does not regard the 
sex as a more serious violation of her rights than the pinch. Not all 
nonconsensual sex should be regarded as a serious crime. 
Alexander, supra note 73, at 173. 
 241. See text accompanying notes 203–05. 
 242. Cf. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (holding, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, that causes that are neither necessary nor sufficient do not satisfy cause in fact). 
But see Eric A. Johnson, Cause-in-Fact After Burrage v. United States, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1727, 
1731 (2016) (arguing that Burrage fails on its own terms because the ordinary understanding of 
cause in fact has always included work arounds when the but-for test fails). 
 243. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 53, at 183 (arguing that, with respect to a hypothetical 
married couple, that if A is going to be “verbally abusive and generally difficult to live with” B 
is not “justified in acquiescing first and prosecuting later” and concluding that it is “arguable that 
she should stand her ground or leave”); Stewart, supra note 2, at 185 (arguing that contract law 
should not give a duress defense if B had reasonable alternatives). 
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whether his behavior is itself sufficient to prevent him from availing himself 
of her consent even if that consent counts as freely given. Our normative and 
conceptual tools are impoverished by a focus on coercionC alone. 
CONCLUSION 
Although I have since been unable to find the website, as I was researching 
coercion, I came across a chatroom where a woman complained that her 
husband would “whine like a wounded puppy” until she performed oral sex 
on him. She asked her fellow chat room inhabitants if this was “coerced sex.” 
They told her it was. Indeed, the tenor of the commentary deemed her 
husband a rapist. 
We simply cannot make progress with such flat-footed approaches. It was 
coerced and it was not. We ought to be able to have conversations about how 
people treat each other, and the terms of sexual negotiations, without a 
conclusion that the crime is rape. And yet, having decided that coercion 
undermines consent, and sex without consent is rape, we seem to have no 
mechanism to bypass this conclusion. 
One ambition, then, for this paper is simply to open up dialogue. We 
should discuss the contours of coercionC, we should separately discuss the 
scope of coercionW, and we should have a further debate about the 
implications of a finding of coercionW. Even if you disagree with my precise 
line-drawings, my hope is to have opened up conceptual and normative space 
for nuanced disagreement. Ansari can have behaved wrongfully by 
badgering, wrongfully by availing himself of the oral sex, and yet still not be 
a rapist. We need space to acknowledge that. 
In sum, there are two distinct normative functions of coercion, and each 
has a role to play with respect to consent. Using terms like “coerced sex” 
elides moral nuances and prevents engaged debates about the same topic. As 
we understand the mechanics of consent better, we can engage more fruitfully 
in the debates we wish to have about the sorts of behaviors that undermine 
choice and the sorts of behaviors that inhibit us from availing ourselves of 
choices by others. 
